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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN AN ERA OF
CONSOLIDATED POWER*
CARLEEN M. ZUBRZYCKI **
Punitive damages are back in the news, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
surrounding them is a mess. The Court’s decisions do, however, reveal one
striking and unifying theme: the Court does not trust others to assess punitive
damages fairly. Instead, at every turn, the Court has adopted rules that move
the locus of power over punitive damages away from juries, factfinders, states,
and communities, and toward appellate judges (including the Court itself). The
result is that the amounts of punitive damages—historically, firmly within the
power of juries—are now subject to an unprecedented level of centralized
control, a phenomenon I call judicial centralization. This Article traces the
rather remarkable narrative of the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence
through the lens of judicial centralization and considers whether it is desirable,
concluding that it is not. The primary justifications for judicial centralization
are uniformity and predictability, but the flip sides—particularity and
variability—serve similarly important functions. Institutional competence also
does not provide a compelling explanation, as both judges and juries have real
claims to the type of moral expertise that punitive damages implicate.
Ultimately, the deciding factor in this inquiry is democratic values. In an age
where power is increasingly consolidated in large corporations and the ability of
the “little guy” to affect the world is ever-diminishing, punitive damages can
serve as an important opportunity for voice, and judicial centralization
undermines this important value.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on punitive damages—developed
almost entirely over the course of the last three decades—is a conceptual mess.
Commentators have spent the greater part of those decades critiquing the
Court’s approach 1 or attempting to construct theoretical models that could
1. See, e.g., Anthony Sebok, Normative Theories of Punitive Damages: The Case of Deterrence, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW OF TORTS 317 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) [hereinafter
Sebok, Normative Theories] (noting that the Court’s “theory of common law punitive damages leaves
many questions unanswered”); Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court
Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 777 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s
varied efforts to limit arbitrary punitive damages awards “has been completely arbitrary in its own
right”); Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That Would Be King of
Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 464 (2005) (characterizing the Court’s approach to punitive
damages as “judicial miniaturism because of its myopic focus on one-on-one torts,” thereby preventing
states from responding to corporate wrongdoing); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to
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provide coherent conceptual support for different portions of the Court’s
jurisprudence 2 with varying degrees of success. Essentially no one, however,
defends the body of jurisprudence on its own terms.
The Court’s lack of clarity mirrors the deep disagreement in the academic
literature about what purposes punitive damages may legitimately serve in our
tort system. 3 While the Court has long explained that punitive damages are
Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1029 (2007) [hereinafter Sebok, Myth to Theory] (arguing, among other
things, that the ratio component of the Court’s due process jurisprudence “lacks any principled
foundation, and does not even have the virtue of being an arbitrary rule chosen by the legislature”);
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 25, 26 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation] (arguing that the Court
has unduly elevated a retributive understanding of the purposes of punitive damages); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1772 (2012) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Palsgraf] (characterizing the Court’s punitive damages due process jurisprudence as “[a]n
[a]rc of [i]ncoherence”).
2. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past,
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 394 (2008) (seeking to “provide the
theoretical defense of the Court’s holding [that punitive damages cannot be used to punish wrongdoers
for injuries to nonparties] that is missing from its own opinion”); Sebok, Myth to Theory, supra note 1,
at 1032 (providing a framework of punitive damages as personal revenge and noting, for instance, that
it offers a justification for the Court’s rule prohibiting punishment for harms to nonparties); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 350–52 (2003) [hereinafter
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages] (arguing that the Court’s decision in State Farm
“[p]erhaps unwittingly” legitimated a non-punitive rationale for punitive damages, which Sharkey
articulates as “societal damages”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 105, 130 (2005) [hereinafter Zipursky, Theory of Punitive Damages] (offering the theory that
punitive damages have a “double aspect”—one relating to the state’s interests and one relating to
individual victims’ interests—and that, once this dual aspect is disentangled, it suggests that the seminal
case BMW v. Gore was rightly decided—but noting that “the Court is not explicit” about this theory
“and indeed, expressly says it is doing something different”).
3. The approaches to punitive damages generally track broader theoretical approaches to tort
law. At the risk of dramatically simplifying a rich area, these generally fall into three categories. First,
under the law and economics view, damages aim to force actors to internalize the costs of their behavior,
and punitive damages are no exception. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 1, at 779 (“The ultimate goal
of modern tort law jurisprudence should be to make injurers internalize the full costs of all of their
actions so that they will take the proper level of care—not too much, not too little, but just right.”).
Under this view, punitive damages must be imposed “for deterrence purposes” whenever a tortfeasor
has escaped liability previously, regardless of whether his conduct was intentional or egregious; on the
other hand, imposing punitive damages for conduct that gives rise to little concrete harm simply
because it is morally reprehensible risks “overdeterrence,” leading to an overall reduction in social
welfare. Id. Second, along similar lines, Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have
argued that punitive damages should be calculated by simply multiplying the harm caused by a tort by
the likelihood of its underdetection. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 889 (1998). Others within a law and economics framework
have built out more novel economic justifications for punitive damages, generally by broadening the
scope of harms that should be incorporated into the calculus. Finally, and perhaps most notably,
Professor Catherine Sharkey has argued that punitive damages should be reconceptualized as “societal
damages”—essentially, damages meant to compensate society for the harms that the defendant’s
conduct imposed on those beyond the plaintiff, which might otherwise not be properly accounted for
in potential tortfeasors’ cost-benefit analyses. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note
2, at 2.
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meant to “punish and deter,” 4 the questions of what that means and whether
those are appropriate aims for private litigation are the subject of an enormous
body of literature. 5 While the jurisprudential underpinnings are murky, from
ten thousand feet, one defining strand of unity emerges: a move towards
centralization. 6 In multiple intertwined doctrinal areas, the Court’s punitive

Others view tort law as source of corrective justice, with the aim of creating a system of duties
and responsibilities that are incurred when those duties are violated or, more broadly, to promote moral
repair. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 384–85 (1992) (“To understand tort law is to
see it in part as a web of substantive and structural rules designed to enforce claims in corrective
justice.”). Some corrective justice theories of tort law try to incorporate punitive damages by suggesting
that they allow for plaintiffs to be compensated for nonmonetary losses that are not otherwise
incorporated into compensatory damages. For instance, Jeffrey Berryman has argued that punitive
damages compensate plaintiffs for dignitary harms. See Jeffrey Berryman, Reconceptualizing Aggravated
Damages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and Referential Loss, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1521, 1542 (2004).
A third closely related body of scholarship developed over the last few decades asserts that the
purpose of tort law generally is to create a system of civil redress that allows victims to pursue justice
against those who have harmed them. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 712–13, 749 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky,
Rights, Wrongs and Recourse]. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg,
Constitutional Status] (arguing that tort law, properly conceived as a system of redress for private
wrongs, is a foundational part of the structure of American government with constitutional status).
Under this conception, the basic purpose of punitive damages can be understood, roughly, as allowing
victims of wrongs recognized by the state to seek a form of private retribution from the person or entity
that wronged them that corresponds more to the egregiousness of the wrong than to the plaintiff’s
actual injury. Professor Markel offered a twist on this basic idea by proposing the “confrontational
conception of retributivism,” which emphasizes society’s interest in retribution while also prioritizing
the minimization of different types of error and variation in punishment. Dan Markel, Retributive
Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 257–59
(2009). More recently, in a similar spirit, Professor Hershovitz offered a theory of punitive damages
as a substitute for revenge and contends that this substitute can operate as a form of corrective justice.
See Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 87–88 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014). For a particularly enjoyable and timely discussion of what
wrongs committed by robots might tell us about the role of concepts like “revenge” and “retribution,”
see generally Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 579 (2018) (arguing that
retribution asks what the wrongdoer deserves but revenge focuses on the personal desire of the
wrongdoer’s victim).
Finally, and most recently, Professor Tilley has offered a “New Doctrinal” account of tort law as
a tool for the creation of communities. See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside out, 126 YALE L.J.
1320, 1324 (2017). Under this approach, punitive damages may serve as a mechanism for stigmatization,
and the appropriate role and processes for those damages likely depends upon the nature of the
community relationships at stake in any given case. Id. at 1398.
4. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II), 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007)
(“[P]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101,
107 (1893) (“The recovery of damages, beyond compensation for the injury received, by way of
punishing the guilty, and as an example to deter others from offending in like manner, is here clearly
recognized.”).
5. See supra note 3.
6. See infra Part I.
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damages decisions have shifted the locus of control over large punitive damages
awards away from dispersed, ground-level actors—like juries, trial judges, and
even state courts and legislatures—toward a narrower group of appellate judges,
including the Court itself.
The question this Article takes up is whether this judicial centralization is
for the better. The time for this consideration is ripe. While the Roberts Court
has demonstrated a (welcome) reluctance to wade into the morass of punitive
damages law, punitive damages awards have not faded from public importance.
In December 2018, Johnson & Johnson lost its bid to have a trial judge overturn
what will, if affirmed, be one of the largest punitive damages awards in history:
a $4.7 billion award imposed by a jury upon finding that Johnson & Johnson
knew for decades that its baby powder contained asbestos. 7 An appeal is,
undoubtedly, forthcoming. 8 A few years ago, in a case alleging a pharmaceutical
company’s twelve-year campaign to hide a drug’s cancer risks, a federal trial
judge felt compelled by the Supreme Court’s recent due process jurisprudence
to reduce a jury award of $9 billion to $37 million—a swing of $8.6 billion. 9
And the question of punitive damages looms in the background of other major
litigations, including the surge of lawsuits seeking to pin responsibility for the
opioid crisis on pharmaceutical companies, pharmacies, executives, doctors, and
others who allegedly knowingly misled the public or promoted the misuse of
opioids. 10 The shift in power over punitive damages up the chain and towards
the Supreme Court has enormous practical impact, and the question of whether
any benefit from this centralization is worth its costs is urgently important. This
Article seeks to address that question and also to consider what the case study
of punitive damages indicates about larger trends in the federal courts.
Toward that end, this Article begins in Part I by reconstructing the Court’s
punitive damages case law in some depth because appreciating this judicial
centralization requires a holistic view of the “forest” of the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area. That forest, in turn, is made up of the rather
7. Tiffany Hsu, Johnson & Johnson Loses Bid To Overturn a $4.7 Billion Baby Powder Verdict, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/business/johnson-johnson-babypowder-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/C2RV-9VN4 (dark archive)].
8. See id.
9. Jessica Dye, U.S. Judge Slashes $9 Billion Award vs. Takeda, Lilly over Diabetes Drug, REUTERS
(Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-takeda-pharma-actos-ruling/u-s-judge-slashes-9billion-award-vs-takeda-lilly-over-diabetes-drug-idUSKBN0IG26N20141028
[https://perma.cc/R2N9-WY99].
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., No. 1883-CV-01808-BLS2, 2019 WL
939120 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019) (plaintiff suing Purdue Pharma for its role in contributing to
the opioid crisis). There are more than two hundred lawsuits involving more than four hundred plaintiff
cities, states, and other entities that have been consolidated into one multi-district litigation. In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017). While settlement in some or all of
these cases is likely, the settlement negotiations are necessarily conducted against the backdrop risks of
punitive damages awards that are, themselves, a product of the Court’s jurisprudence.
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extraordinary cases in which juries have issued punitive damages awards so
extreme as to grab the Court’s limited attention. Part II assesses judicial
centralization on its merits. On the one hand, centralization lends greater
uniformity and predictability to awards. On the other hand, it diminishes
variability and particularity, which also have virtues. Because no answer
emerges in the abstract, Part III takes a step back and explores how judicial
centralization intersects with broader phenomena. In an era of increased
consolidation of power and social stratification in a wide range of areas,
individuals’ and communities’ opportunities for “voice” are ever-decreasing,
and local participation in the larger forces shaping the world is a diminishing
but important value. On this dimension, there should be serious concerns about
judicial centralization as a tool historically used to hold the powerful to account
for their treatment of the “little guy.”
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A.

The Early Years: Punitive Damage from the Founding to 1978

Punitive damages in the American tradition11 have their roots in two
eighteenth-century English cases, Wilkes v. Wood 12 and Huckle v. Money, 13 in
which juries issued awards to punish egregious misconduct far in excess of the
actual damages suffered by the plaintiffs. 14 Those cases were widely discussed

11. On a grander view of history, punitive damages date back far longer—others have discussed
their roots in everything from Hammurabi’s Code to the Torah. See, e.g., Elliot Klayman & Seth
Klayman, Punitive Damages: Toward Torah-Based Tort Reform, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 226 (2001)
(noting that the Torah “has been called ‘the harbinger of modern punitive damages’” (quoting Melvin
M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49
UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (1980))); see also, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491 (2008)
(citing the Code of Hammurabi).
12. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Lofft 2.
13. (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768; 2 Wils. K.B. 206.
14. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769; Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498; see also Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co.
v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893) (describing Wilkes as “[t]he most distinct suggestion of the doctrine
of exemplary or punitive damages in England before the American Revolution”). The Wilkes case arose
in 1762 when British politician John Wilkes published a pamphlet that allegedly slandered the King.
Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493–94. In response, the King’s ministers ransacked Wilkes’s home pursuant
to a general warrant. Id. at 489. Although Wilkes’s actual compensable damages from the invasion were
limited, the court imposed a massive damages award of £4000, justifying this award for “more than the
injury received” on the basis that “[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future,
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.” Id. at 498–99. In Huckle, a jury similarly
imposed a substantial damage award to punish the abusive use of a general warrant. Huckle, 95 Eng.
Rep. at 768–69. The English court affirmed that use of “exemplary damages,” explaining that the jury
had properly issued the larger award given the egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior,
notwithstanding the “small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station and
rank in life.” Id.

98 N.C. L. REV. 315 (2020)

2020]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

321

in American political circles at the time of the Founding. 15 By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the Court recognized that it was a “well-established
principle of the common law” that in “all actions on the case for torts, a jury
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a
defendant”—damages measured based on “the enormity of [the] offence rather
than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.” 16 In practice, punitive
damages in early American cases served a number of different purposes, ranging
from compensating plaintiffs for intangible injuries to punishing defendants in
order to deter similar conduct in the future. 17
It was taken as a given that the assessment of these damages would
generally be up to the jury. 18 As the Supreme Court explained in 1851:
15. In addition to its role in establishing punitive damages in the Anglo-American tradition, the
Wilkes case is foundational in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, serving as a paradigmatic example of
the abuses that general warrants can give rise to. Many scholars understand the Fourth Amendment to
have been drafted with the primary goal of enshrining the principle that such warrants are unlawful.
See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–68 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (documenting many
authorities that stand for the proposition that general warrants were the Fourth Amendment’s specific
target during the Founding Era); Scott Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless
Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 509 (2004) (suggesting that the
“concern over general warrants . . . suppl[ies] a theoretical and historical underpinning” for Fourth
Amendment law). This history is suggestive of a prominent feature of current punitive damages
jurisprudence, which is that even today, large punitive awards are often awarded in cases involving the
abuse of power by large, wealthy entities against individuals. The Supreme Court acknowledged a
similar point as far back as 1893, when it explained that “[i]f a public corporation, like an individual,
acts oppressively, wantonly, abuses power, and a citizen in that way is injured, the citizen, in addition
to strict compensation, may have, the law says, something in the way of smart money; something as
punishment for the oppressive use of power.” Prentice, 147 U.S. at 104.
16. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
17. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History
of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 197 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, What
Did Punitive Damages Do?] (reviewing early cases and explaining that the cases “can be placed into six
categories: (1) compensation for emotional suffering; (2) compensation for insult; (3) personal
vindication; (4) vindication of the state; (5) punishment to set an example; and (6) punishment to
deter”); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair vs. Full Compensation, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 444 (2006) (explaining that broad damage awards were not categorized as
“punitive” or “compensatory” but were rather understood as the redress to which a claimant was
entitled to by virtue of having been subject to egregious mistreatment); id. at 445–47 (explaining that
even nominally compensatory awards were understood to depend in part on the nature of the
misconduct, not just the plaintiff’s harm). Over time, state court judges took steps to render awards
more rational and predictable, and tort awards were increasingly bifurcated into compensatory and
punitive elements. Id. at 453–55 (tracing history). One way to understand the Court’s more recent
jurisprudence outlined in this Article is as a further dramatic step in this process of rationalizing and
containing damage awards.
18. See, e.g., Day, 54 U.S. at 371. In Prentice, a train conductor allegedly intentionally had a doctor
onboard arrested, without cause, in a particularly humiliating manner, and the jury instructions were
as follows:
And, further, after agreeing upon [compensatory damages], you may add something by way
of punitive damages against the defendant, which is sometimes called smart money, if you are
satisfied that the conductor’s conduct was illegal, (and it was illegal), wanton, and oppressive.
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In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious,
or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the measured
compensation of the plaintiff which he would have been entitled to
recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or intention,
something farther by way of punishment or example, which has
sometimes been called “smart money.” This has been always left to the
discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus inflicted
must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case. 19
Because punitive damages were issued in the context of common law
actions arising under state law, the Court rarely had occasion to opine on them
directly during the first two hundred years of the Republic. 20
In the early twentieth century, Lochner v. New York 21 ushered in the era of
economic substantive due process jurisprudence, during which the Court struck
down numerous laws and regulations on the theory that the Constitution’s Due
Process Clause enshrines a substantive right to be free of economic restrictions
and penalties in a variety of contexts. 22 The longstanding common law tradition
of punitive damages, however, remained essentially untouched even during the
Lochner era. 23 Indeed, in its only due process challenge to punitive damages, the
Court concluded that corporations lacked a substantive due process right to be
free of respondeat superior liability for punitive damages. 24
B.

Centralizing Punitive Damages: A Story in Three (or Maybe Four) Parts

Beginning in the 1980s, there was an increasing groundswell of public
criticism over punitive damages awards, which were considered “out of

How much that shall be the court cannot tell you. You must act as reasonable men, and not
indulge vindictive feelings towards the defendant.
Prentice, 147 U.S. at 103–04.
19. Day, 54 U.S. at 371. Along the same lines, another nineteenth-century case described the
imposition of punitive damages in some cases as “[t]he right of the jury.” Denver & Rio Grand Ry.
Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 609 (1887) (“The right of the jury in some cases to award exemplary or
punitive damages is no longer an open question in this court.”).
20. The Court has had occasion to address various questions surrounding availability of punitive
damages in various federal statutory schemes. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that municipalities could not be subject to punitive damages under 28
U.S.C. § 1983); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979) (addressing availability
of punitive damages under the Railway Labor Act).
21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and
the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 758 (2009).
23. See Rustad, supra note 1, at 504 n.305 (identifying cases in the second half of the nineteenth
century and early twentieth century where a few plaintiffs successfully argued that the imposition of
punitive damages after a criminal conviction for the same underlying conduct violated the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy).
24. See Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 115 (1927).
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control.” 25 The empirical accuracy of this characterization was, to say the least,
doubtful. 26 But the Supreme Court took note, 27 and in the ensuing decades
developed a number of doctrinal threads that enabled it to solve this perceived
problem. The overall effect was to vest an unprecedented level of substantive
control over punitive damages in the Court itself, and the federal courts of
appeals, at the particular expense of juries and trial judges.
1. Centralized Substantive Rules: The Supreme Court’s Creation of Rules
Limiting the Quantity and Purposes of Punitive Damages
a.

The Lead-Up

Before 1989, the Supreme Court had never so much as suggested that the
Constitution had anything to say about the size of punitive damages awards
issued by juries in state courts. Yet by 1996, when the Court for the first time
struck down a punitive damages award as substantively excessive in the
landmark case BMW v. Gore, 28 it was hardly a surprise. In the intervening seven
years from 1989 to 1996, the Court repeatedly considered substantive challenges
to punitive damages awards, and Gore was the logical extension of the Court’s
reasoning in those decisions. 29 Given the discretionary nature of the Court’s
25. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (describing the politicization of the punitive damages discussion as the result of
“an intense, well-organized, and well-financed political campaign by interest groups seeking
fundamental reforms in the civil justice system benefiting themselves”); Sebok, Myth to Theory, supra
note 1, at 962 (noting that the idea that punitive damages are out of control has been a “recurring theme
in the literature” since 1985); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive
Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 453–63 (2010)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Federal Incursions].
26. A significant body of research suggests that the punitive damages “crisis” was a fiction. See,
e.g., Rustad, supra note 1, at 462 n.6 (“Despite the diversity in research methods and samples, research
studies of the law in action agree that there is no punitive damages crisis.”); Sebok, Myth to Theory,
supra note 1, at 962–76 (debunking the “myth” that overall punitive damages awards had recently
changed in frequency or amount).
27. Consistent with—and, at times, perhaps driving—this trend, lawyers representing major
businesses began filing “scores of amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court” urging the Court to impose
new restrictions on punitive damages. Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the
Court that Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV 461, 462 (2005). For a discussion of the
role of industry groups’ persistent lobbying of the Court in this area, see Michael Rustad & Thomas
Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV.
91, 95–99 (1993).
28. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
29. See id. at 572 (stating that the decision of the Court follows from the principles discussed in
previous cases). A devoted group of industry lawyers, led by Ted Olson, brought a number of cases
involving punitive damages earlier in the 1980s, some of which also ultimately provided hints that the
justices were concerned about the constitutionality of punitive damages. See Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 71 (1988) (declining to address arguments that the punitive damages
award violated Eighth Amendment or due process principles because those arguments were not
properly preserved); id. at 86–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (expressing concern that lack of standards
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docket, the sheer concentration of punitive cases the court considered makes
clear that the Court was newly concerned about punitive damages. 30
The Court’s 1989 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc. 31 was the first harbinger. 32 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected
the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to a punitive damages award and
declined to reach any due process question for procedural reasons. 33 In a
concurrence, however, Justices Brennan and Marshall essentially invited the
defense bar to bring cases raising due process challenges to punitive damages
awards, joining the majority “on the understanding that it leaves the door open
for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive
damages in civil cases brought by private parties.” 34
Unsurprisingly, the defense bar took Justices Brennan and Marshall’s
invitation to heart. Two terms later, the Court granted certiorari in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,35 which properly presented a due process
challenge. 36 While the Court ultimately upheld the $1 million punitive damages
award in that case, it stated that the award might be “close to the line” of
constitutional excessiveness—suggesting, for the first time, that there was a
substantive line that might, in some other case, be crossed. 37
In 1993, the Court made explicit what had been left implicit in Haslip: the
Due Process Clause was the source of a substantive right to be free from
excessive punitive damages awards, regardless of the procedures used to impose
them. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 38 a jury entered an
award consisting of $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in
punitive damages against an oil company that had brought frivolous lawsuits
to guide juries may violate procedural due process principles and stating that the issue would warrant
the Court’s attention in an “appropriate case”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828–29
(1986) (finding it unnecessary to reach arguments that punitive damages awards might violate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment or procedural due process principles, but noting that
those arguments involved “important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved”).
30. For background on the rareness, and corresponding salience, of certiorari grants, see Jeffrey
S. Sutton & Brittany Jones, The Certiorari Process and State Court Decisions, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 167,
169 (2018).
31. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
32. Id. at 280.
33. Id. at 274–77.
34. Id. at 280–82 (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
36. See id. at 9–10.
37. Id. at 20. The substantive implication of this holding was only underscored by Justice
O’Connor’s forceful dissent, in which she argued that the trial processes (including vague jury
instructions) did not meet the requirements of procedural due process and that there was no need for
the Court to invoke substantive due process principles. Id. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Justice
O’Connor’s view, the jury instructions—which gave the jury nearly unfettered discretion to award
punitive damages—were so unclear as to be void for vagueness. See id. (“The vagueness question is not
even close.”).
38. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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and pursued other fraudulent actions in order to reduce the payments the oil
company would be required to make under an oil and gas lease and had engaged
in “similar nefarious activities” in other business dealings. 39 The Court
ultimately affirmed the punitive damages award—but the plurality stressed that
a defendant’s due process rights could be violated by an excessively large
punitive damages award regardless of whether there were any procedural
defects underlying the award. 40 The plurality declined, however, to adopt a test
or otherwise provide guidance regarding when that threshold might be crossed,
instead explaining only that “[a] general concer[n] of reasonableness . . .
properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus.” 41 In the case before it, the
Court simply accounted for factors, including “the amount of money potentially
at stake [with respect to the oil contract], the bad faith of petitioner, the fact
that the scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud,
trickery and deceit, and petitioner’s wealth,” and concluded that taken together
those factors indicated that the award was not “so ‘grossly excessive’ as to be
beyond the power of the State to allow.”42
b.

BMW v. Gore: A New Substantive Due Process Right

In 1996, the Supreme Court reached its breaking point in the landmark
case of BMW of North America, Inc., v. Gore. 43 The Court for the first time
invalidated a punitive damages award on substantive due process grounds. 44 At
first glance, the facts of the case look tailor-made for an excessiveness challenge:
in contrast to the many punitive damages cases brought by sympathetic, often
injured, victims, in this case, the plaintiff was a doctor who brought suit against
BMW for a poor paint job on a perfectly functional luxury car. 45 The plaintiff,
Dr. Ira Gore, purchased a new BMW for roughly $40,000, and upon taking the
car in to repaint it, he discovered that the car’s paint had been damaged and
recoated by BMW prior to purchasing it. 46 Although BMW maintained it was
39. Id. at 450–51 (plurality opinion).
40. In reaching that conclusion, the plurality relied primarily on the Court’s year-old precedent
in Haslip and a number of Lochner-era precedents invalidating state-imposed fines and penalties. Id. at
453–54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)). The Lochner-era cases
on which the Court relied involved challenges to state-imposed penalties, rather than to awards of
punitive damages in private tort suits. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78
(1907)(concluding that the state law imposing a $50 fine on common carriers who failed to timely pay
claims for loss or damages was constitutional, but suggesting that there might be constitutional
limitations on states’ ability to impose larger fines); St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S.
63, 66–67 (1919) (noting that it has been “fully recognized” that the Due Process Clause limits states’
abilities to prescribe penalties for violations of state law).
41. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458.
42. Id. at 462.
43. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
44. Id. at 559.
45. Id. at 563, 576.
46. Id. at 563.
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unaware that the value of the car had diminished as a result of the repainting,
Gore presented expert testimony suggesting that the car’s resale value was
reduced by as much as ten percent. 47 The jury awarded Gore $4000 in
compensatory damages. 48 But, upon finding that BMW’s policy (under which
it did not disclose presale repairs amounting to less than three percent of a car’s
value) constituted “gross, oppressive, or malicious” fraud, the jury imposed a
punitive damages award of $4 million. 49 The case made its way to the Alabama
Supreme Court, which reduced the award to $2 million on the basis that the
jury appeared to have improperly sought to punish out-of-state conduct. 50 The
Court ultimately granted certiorari on the question of whether the punitive
damages award was so large as to violate BMW’s right to due process. 51
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court concluded that the
size of the Alabama jury’s punitive damages award violated BMW’s right to due
process. 52 In so ruling, the Court established three “guideposts” for ascertaining
whether an award is constitutionally excessive. The first guidepost, and
“perhaps most important,” is the reprehensibility of the underlying conduct. 53
The second guidepost—and, in the subsequent years, most controversial—is the
ratio between the punitive damages award and the extent of the harm, or
potential harm, it caused. 54 Although the Court purported to “reject[] the
notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula,”
it explained that, in general, the amount of punitive damages awards should not
exceed a “10-to-1 ratio” to the amount of any compensatory damages award.55
The third guidepost is the relationship between the punitive damages award
and the severity of civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
“comparable misconduct.” 56
2. De Novo Appellate Review of Punitive Damages
In principle, this change need not result in a dramatic shift in power over
punitive damages awards. In the ensuing years, however, the approach that the
Court adopted to implement Gore’s guideposts did just that in a series of
subsequent cases.

47. Id. at 564.
48. Id. at 565.
49. Id.
50. At trial, BMW indicated that it had declined to disclose similar presale repairs regarding
fourteen cars in Alabama, and 983 others across America. See id. at 564.
51. Id. at 568.
52. Id. at 585–86.
53. Id. at 575.
54. Id. at 580.
55. Id. at 582.
56. Id. at 583.
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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.

First, in 2001, a divided Court held that the review of trial courts’
application of the Gore excessiveness guideposts should be de novo. 57 In the
underlying dispute, a jury concluded that a manufacturer had tried to pass its
product off as a competitor’s name-brand tool. The jury awarded $50,000 in
compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The district court
upheld the award under the Gore guideposts, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit
applied an abuse-of-discretion standard and affirmed. 58
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Ninth Circuit should
have applied a de novo standard of review for largely prudential reasons. 59 In
particular, the majority initially gave three primary reasons for determining
which standard of review should govern the reasonable suspicion/probable cause
inquiry in the Fourth Amendment context: (1) reasonable suspicion and
probable cause “cannot be articulated with precision,” but are instead “fluid
concepts” that must be defined in context; (2) the legal rules “acquire content
only through application,” and de novo review is “therefore necessary if
appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles”;
and (3) “de novo review tends to unify precedent” and “stabilize the law.” 60
Explaining that these three features also apply to the Gore excessiveness
standard, the Court concluded with little further analysis that de novo review
applied. 61
Notably missing from the majority’s discussion was whether any of these
three features—precisely defined standards, appellate control, or unified
precedent—are useful or important in the context of punitive damages. In a few
stray lines addressing Seventh Amendment concerns, the Court breezily
explained that “[d]ifferences in the institutional competence of trial judges and
appellate judges are consistent with” de novo review. 62 It recognized that
district courts might “have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals”
with respect to reprehensibility (the “most important” Gore guidepost), that the
second guidepost (the ratio between the compensatory damages and punitive
damages) could be assessed equally well by trial and appellate courts, and that
the third guidepost (a broad comparison of penalties for similar violations) is
more suited to appellate review. 63 The Court stopped short of asserting that

57. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001) (“[C]ourts of
appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’ determinations of
the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.”).
58. Id. at 426.
59. Id. at 436.
60. Id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 697–98 (1996)).
61. Id. at 436.
62. Id. at 440, 449.
63. Id. at 440.
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institutional competencies actually support de novo review; instead, it
concluded that they “fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate
review.” 64 Having reached this conclusion, the Court remanded to the Ninth
Circuit to apply the proper standard, but not before detailing a number of
“questionable conclusions” by the district court judge that “may not survive de
novo review.” 65
As Justice Ginsburg’s forceful dissent makes clear, the application of de
novo review to a factually intensive question of tort damages is especially
striking in light of the Court’s approach to the standard of review regarding
purportedly excessive compensatory damages. 66 In Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. 67—decided the same term as Gore—the Court held that
“appellate review of a federal trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a jury’s
verdict as excessive” was reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment if the
standard of review was “abuse of discretion,” while strongly suggesting that a
more robust standard of review would pose a constitutional problem. 68 The
Court held that “practical reasons combine with Seventh Amendment
constraints to lodge in the district court, not the court of appeals, primary
responsibility for application of an excessiveness standard,” and that
emphasized the importance of trial judges’ “unique opportunity to consider the
evidence in the living courtroom context.” 69 As Justice Ginsburg stressed in her
Cooper dissent, it is not obvious that Gasperini’s logic should not apply equally
to allegations that punitive damages are excessive, as both compensatory
damages and punitive damages involve intangible and difficult-to-quantify
concepts (like the dollar value of “pain and suffering”), and both are
fundamentally dependent on determinations that are understood as factfinding, like the extent of harm or potential harm caused, and the defendant’s
good faith and mens rea. 70
In closing, Justice Ginsburg stressed that even the majority agreed that
district courts are better positioned to consider the most important Gore factor
(reprehensibility), and that “in the typical case envisioned by Gore,” appellate

64. Id. at 440.
65. Id. at 441, 443.
66. Id. at 445–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment but wrote separately to stress that, given the opportunity, he would overrule Gore’s
substantive guideposts. Id. at 443 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also concurred, writing
separately to indicate that he continued to disagree with Gore and generally believed that the Court
should apply a deferential standard of review to fact-bound constitutional questions. Id. at 443–44
(Scalia, J., concurring). Given the state of the Court’s precedents, however, he concurred in the
judgment. See id. at 444.
67. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
68. Id. at 434, 428–39.
69. Id. at 438.
70. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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courts thus “should have infrequent occasion to reverse.” 71 Thus, she predicted,
so long as lower courts carefully separate out fact-findings that qualify for
clearly erroneous review, the practical difference between the Court’s approach
and her own “is not large.” 72
b. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell: De Novo
Review in Practice
Time quickly proved Justice Ginsburg’s (perhaps hortatory) prediction
wrong. In 2003, the Court had an opportunity to demonstrate what its new de
novo review would look like in practice. It did so in State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Campbell (Campbell II) 73 where a major corporation abused its
power against elderly, vulnerable customers in a context rather far removed
from the car-paint damage at issue in Gore. 74
In the underlying incident, Curtis Campbell, an elderly man suffering
from a recent stroke and early-stage Parkinson’s disease, attempted to pass a
truck on a two-lane road, forcing an oncoming vehicle to swerve onto the
shoulder to avoid him. 75 The driver of the oncoming vehicle was killed and
another was permanently disabled. 76 Insurance experts and State Farm’s
investigators agreed early on that Mr. Campbell was at fault. 77 Notwithstanding
that clarity, in ensuing tort suits brought by the estate of the deceased driver
and by the disabled passenger, State Farm refused offers to settle for a mere
$50,000—Mr. Campbell’s policy limit—even though it assured Mr. Campbell
and his wife that the company was representing their interests, that their assets
were not at risk, and that they should not obtain their own counsel. 78
Subsequently, and unsurprisingly, a jury concluded that Mr. Campbell was onehundred percent responsible for the crash and returned a judgment of $185,849
against him. 79 State Farm refused to cover the $135,849 that exceeded Mr.
Campbell’s policy limit. 80 Instead, State Farm’s counsel told the Campbells to
put their house up for sale “to get things moving,” and State Farm refused to
post a bond to allow Mr. Campbell to appeal the judgment. 81 The “utterly

71. Id. at 449.
72. Id. at 449–50.
73. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
74. See id. at 412–13.
75. Id. at 412, 434.
76. Id. at 413.
77. Id.
78. Id. The settlement offers for the policy limits were made as late as a month before trial. See
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Campbell I), 65 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001).
79. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 413.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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dismayed” Campbells obtained other counsel and quickly “learned that their
situation was indeed grave.” 82
In coordination with the plaintiffs in the tort suit against them, the
Campbells brought suit against State Farm alleging bad faith. 83 Among other
things, discovery revealed that when State Farm’s analyst concluded that there
was a high risk of liability if the case went to trial, his manager ordered him to
change his conclusion, and a second analyst who agreed that liability was likely
was removed from the case. 84 The jury concluded that State Farm had acted
unreasonably and in bad faith by taking the case to trial. 85
At the penalty phase, State Farm continued to argue that its decision to
take the case to trial was an “honest mistake.” 86 In response, the Campbells
produced a rather astonishing collection of evidence that State Farm’s decision
to take the case to trial was part of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal
goals by capping payouts on claims company-wide. 87 That clinical insurancework language—“capping payouts”—obscures just how colorful and malicious
State Farm’s efforts to deliberately deceive and cheat its customers were.
Agents “changed the contents of files, lied to customers, and committed other
dishonest and fraudulent acts”—including, for instance, adding an entirely
made-up assertion to the case file that the deceased victim of Campbell’s
accident had been “speeding to visit his pregnant girlfriend.” 88 These fraudulent
practices “were consistently directed to persons—poor racial or ethnic
minorities, women, and elderly individuals—who State Farm believed would
be less likely to object or take legal action.” 89 Past employees testified that they
were explicitly trained to target “the weakest of the herd,” that is, “the elderly,
the poor, and . . . consumers who are least knowledgeable about their rights and
. . . most vulnerable to trickery or deceit, or who have little money and hence
have no real alternative but to accept an inadequate offer to settle a claim at
much less than fair market value.” 90 And an expert witness testified that the
Campbells’ case was a “classic example” of the implementation of this policy. 91
82. Campbell I, 65 P.3d at 1142.
83. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 414.
84. Campbell I, 65 P.3d at 1141–42.
85. Id. at 1142.
86. Id. at 1143.
87. The Campbells adduced “extensive expert testimony” regarding State Farm’s fraudulent
practices, and the trial court made “nearly twenty-eight pages of extensive findings concerning State
Farm’s reprehensible conduct.” Id. at 1147–48.
88. Id. at 1148. (“[The victim] was not speeding, nor did he have a pregnant girlfriend. The only
purpose for the change was to distort the assessment of the value of [the victim’s] claims against State
Farm’s insured.”).
89. Id.
90. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 433 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 433. The trial court’s findings regarding the compensatory damage award here provide
additional color regarding the Campbells. They were “elderly,” Mr. Campbell was experiencing
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If that were not enough, State Farm deliberately destroyed all relevant
documents about the scheme (even while litigation was ongoing);
“systematically harassed and intimidated opposing claimants and witnesses” (by
paying a hotel maid, for instance, to disclose whether a witness to the
Campbells’ case had overnight guests); and expressly instructed its attorneys
and claim superintendents to use “mad dog defense tactics—using the
company’s large resources to ‘wear out’ opposing attorneys by prolonging
litigation, making meritless objections, claiming false privileges, destroying
documents, and abusing the law and motion process.” 92
The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages
and $145 million in punitive damages; the trial judge remitted those awards to
$1 million and $25 million, respectively. 93 The Utah Supreme Court ultimately
reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award. 94 It discussed and applied
the Gore guideposts, heavily emphasizing the egregious and expansive pattern
of misconduct described by the trial court’s extensive findings. 95 The court also
noted that the trial court had found that corporate headquarters “had never
learned of—much less acted upon”—a jury verdict amounting to less than $100
million, and that State Farm’s aggressive and unlawful efforts to conceal its
wrongdoing, on top of its enormous resources, made it exceedingly unlikely that
its similar misconduct would be uncovered. 96
The Supreme Court reversed. 97 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, marched through each Gore guidepost. As for “reprehensibility,” the
Court commented that “State Farm’s handling of the claims against the
Campbells merits no praise, but a more modest punishment could have satisfied
the State’s legitimate objectives.” 98 The Court further explained that it was
impermissible for the state courts to consider “unlawful acts committed outside
residuary effects of a stroke and had Parkinson’s disease, had previously suffered financial setbacks, and
had modest financial resources and no financial reserves. Id. at 434. Mr. Campbell’s past traumas
included “the murder of his first wife, his second wife’s desertion following his stroke, and the death
of his third wife from cancer less than two years after their marriage”; additionally, Mrs. Campbell’s
prior “bitter divorce” and ex-husband’s failure to live up to financial obligations had led to the
repossession of the Campbells’ car and the placement of their home in foreclosure. Order Re
Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial or Remittur regarding the Compensatory Damages Awards at *2f–
g, Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 890905231, 1998 WL 35159343 (Utah Dist. Ct.
Aug. 3, 1998), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001). The trial court elaborated that the
Campbells were “quiet, unassuming, and trusting individuals” who had “readily entrusted their financial
and emotional wellbeing to State Farm,” only to have that trust betrayed. Id. at *2h, *2j.
92. Campbell I, 65 P.3d. at 1148.
93. Id. at 1141.
94. Id. at 1155.
95. Id. at 1152–55.
96. Id. at 1147, 1153 (noting that expert had testified that State Farm’s conduct would come to the
surface in only one of 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability).
97. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
98. Id. at 423.
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of [its] jurisdiction” and that while a pattern of conduct could be probative of
State Farm’s culpability, “[d]ue process does not permit courts . . . to adjudicate
the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims . . . under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis.” 99 The Court concluded that “the Campbells have
shown no conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them,” and “the
only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis” is that which did so. 100
Having effectively thrown out all evidence of the nationwide policy, the
Court had little difficulty concluding that reprehensibility could not provide
constitutional justification for the jury award. As for the “ratio” between
punitive damages and compensatory damages, the Court reiterated its earlier
statements that there are “no rigid benchmarks”—but in the next breath, the
Court asserted that “[s]ingle digit multipliers are more likely to comport with
due process,” and that “when compensatory damages are substantial,” a ratio
“perhaps only equal to compensatory damages” would represent the outer limits
for constitutionality. 101 Finally, Justice Kennedy considered the third Gore
guidepost and noted that the award “dwarf[ed]” Utah’s $10,000 maximum civil
fine for a single instance of fraud. 102 The Court then remanded the case to the
Utah court to set a new award “in the first instance.”103
In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized “the punitive damages jurisprudence
which has sprung forth from BMW v. Gore” as “insusceptible of principled
application.” 104 Justice Ginsburg, in turn, critiqued “the Court’s swift
conversion” of the guidelines from Gore “into instructions that begin to
resemble marching orders.” 105
3. A New Constitutional Prohibition on Jury Control: Honda Motor Corp. v.
Oberg
In a related development in 1994—after TXO and Haslip made clear that
the Court was concerned with the substantive size of punitive damages awards,
but before the contours of the Gore guideposts were established—the Court
considered the limits of how much control over punitive damages states can
permissibly vest in juries. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 106 the Court considered
a procedural due process challenge to an amendment to the Oregon
Constitution that prohibited judicial review of any “fact tried by a jury”—
including, but not limited to, the amount of punitive damages awards—“unless

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 421, 423.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
512 U.S. 415 (1994).
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the court [could] affirmatively say there [was] no evidence to support the
verdict.”107 The Oregon trial court, appellate court, and state supreme court all
held that the state constitutional provision—which had been on the books since
1910—was constitutional. 108 The Oregon Supreme Court explained that while
the scope of judicial review was significantly cabined by the award, the
substantive instructions that Oregon juries were provided to guide their
assessment of punitive damages were significantly more specific than the
instructions provided in most states (and in the underlying decisions in Haslip
and TXO). 109
The Court, however, reversed, holding that the longstanding state
constitutional provision deprived defendants of due process. 110 The Court
explained that its recent decisions (Haslip and TXO) “recognized that the
Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages” and
suggested that the question for assessing the constitutionality of Oregon’s
procedures “should focus on Oregon’s departure from traditional procedures.” 111
The Court then reviewed various early British and American common law cases
allowing for judicial review, and noted that while those cases “emphasized the
deference ordinarily afforded jury verdict,” they also “recognized that juries
sometimes awarded damages so high as to require correction.” 112 While the
plaintiff argued that Oregon used various alternative mechanisms, such as clear
jury instructions, to cabin jury discretion, the Court concluded that these
mechanisms were insufficient, explaining that “[t]he problem that concern[ed]”
the Court was “the possibility that a jury [would] not follow those instructions
and may return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict.” 113
Justice Ginsburg’s vigorous dissent shines a light on what was at stake in
the case. Among other things, the dissent made clear that Oregon’s punitive
damages procedures, as a whole, provide significantly more procedural
protections and detailed guidance to juries than other states’ punitive damages
schemes under which the Court had declined to reduce awards. 114 In short, the
only real difference between Oregon’s system and other systems is that, in
Oregon, the entity evaluating the facts was the jury:
In product liability cases, Oregon guides and limits the factfinder’s
discretion on the availability and amount of punitive damages. The
plaintiff must establish entitlement to punitive damages, under specific
107. Id. at 427 n.5.
108. Id. at 418.
109. Id. at 418–19.
110. Id. at 432.
111. Id. at 420, 421; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
112. Oberg, 512 at 424.
113. Id. at 433.
114. Id. at 438, 450–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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substantive criteria, by clear and convincing evidence. Where the
factfinder is a jury, its decision is subject to judicial review to this extent:
The trial court, or an appellate court, may nullify a verdict if reversible
error occurred during the trial, if the jury was improperly or inadequately
instructed, or if there is no evidence to support the verdict. 115
Oregon’s laws set out “substantive criteria,” and jurors were provided with
“precise instructions detailing them.” 116 Moreover, the specific instructions that
Oregon juries were required to follow closely mirrored the post-verdict standards
judges use in other states where the Court has affirmed jury awards. 117 Justice
Ginsburg stressed that the early history on the question of substantive judicial
review of punitive damages decisions was far less clear than the majority
indicated 118—the Court has long held that it is a state’s prerogative to increase
the power of the jury,119 and the majority invoking its recent substantive due
process jurisprudence was irrelevant to the case at hand. 120 Rather, the question
apparently presented was whether judicial review of the jury award for
compliance with state substantive law was required. The majority position on
that point, she concluded, was “extraordinary, for this Court has never held that
the Due Process Clause requires a State’s courts to police jury fact findings to
ensure their conformity with state law.” 121
4. Coda: Further Glosses from the Court’s Most Recent Cases
Since State Farm, the Court has issued two significant decisions on
punitive damages, both of which shed light on the Court’s broader trajectory
towards centralization.

115. Id. at 436.
116. Oregon required that punitive damages, if any, be awarded based on seven substantive
criteria:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant’s awareness of that likelihood; (c) The profitability of the
defendant’s misconduct; (d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it; (e)
The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct; (f) The financial
condition of the defendant; and (g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive
damage awards to persons in situations similar to the claimant’s and the severity of criminal
penalties to which the defendant has been or may be subjected.
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(3) (1991), amended by Act of July 19, 1995, ch. 688, § 4, 1995 Or. Laws 2073,
2074.
117. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 446.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 449.
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First, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 122 the Court weighed in on the result
of decades-long litigation arising out of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill. 123 The
evidence presented to the jury indicated that the accident was caused by a drunk
captain—the only person licensed to navigate the relevant part of the sound—
who left the bridge during a particularly treacherous path, and that Exxon
officials were well aware that the captain had a long history of alcohol abuse and
had recently relapsed. 124 The result was nearly eleven million gallons of oil
pouring into the Prince William Sound, and the incident is considered one of
the most environmentally damaging oil spills in history. 125 When the case came
to the Court after multiple decades of litigation (including two remands to
account for the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence), a jury had entered a
compensatory award of $507.5 million and a punitive damages award of $4.5
billion, which the Ninth Circuit reduced to $2.5 billion. 126
Unlike the cases discussed above, in Exxon Shipping, the Court was serving
as a “common law court of last review” under its maritime jurisprudence. 127 The
opinion is thus an especially useful window into the Court’s view on punitive
damages from a policy perspective—freed from the restriction of deciding only
what the outer bounds of constitutionality permit, the Court took the
opportunity to opine at length on policy concerns. 128 Justice Souter, writing for
an equally divided court, took the opportunity to offer an extensive overview of
the history of its punitive damages jurisprudence and the current state of the
law across the country and around the world. 129 He then considered the “audible
criticism” of punitive damages awards (which had appeared to motivate much
of the Court’s earlier jurisprudence) but noted that “the most recent studies
tend to undercut much of it.” 130 “The real problem,” he concluded, is “the stark
unpredictability of punitive awards.”131 After discussing some available
statistical evidence about punitive damages, he set out the premise for the
122. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
123. Id. at 476.
124. Id. at 476–78.
125. 12 of the Most Devastating Man-Made Ocean Disasters in History, from Exxon Valdez to Deepwater
Horizon, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/exxon-valdez-spillother-disasters-contaminated-ocean-2019-3#two-decades-after-the-exxon-valdez-disaster-the-us-sawanother-devastating-oil-spill-7 [https://perma.cc/2A8H-SHZD].
126. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 471.
127. Id. at 507.
128. See, e.g., Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation, supra note 1, at 26–27 (2009) (“Sitting as a
common law court of last resort—as opposed to its review posture in the due process trilogy cases,
where it was guided and constrained by constitutional considerations—the Court is up front about its
preoccupation with the negative side effects of the punitive damages remedy, without much focus on
identifying its curative aspirations.”).
129. See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497 (contrasting American practice with that of other countries
and noting that some legal systems decline to enforce foreign punitive judgments).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 499.
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discussion that followed: “The common sense of justice would surely bar
penalties that reasonable people would think excessive for the harm caused in
the circumstances.”132 With “that aim [in mind],” the Court considered available
approaches to setting limits on punitive damages—one potential “verbal”
approach to directing juries properly, and two “numerical” approaches. 133
Ultimately, the Court was “skeptical that verbal formulations, superimposed on
general jury instructions, are the best insurance against unpredictable
outliers.” 134 So, the Court turned to the numbers and ultimately concluded that
because the median punitive award in the studies at hand bore a 1:1 ratio to
compensatory damages, a 1:1 ratio was “a fair upper limit” in maritime cases. 135
Notably, the Court adopted this ratio limitation even though it had not
identified a state court that had adopted an analogous limitation. 136 Instead, the
Court took its cue from state legislative interventions and concluded that it was
empowered to enact an analogous limitation in the maritime context. 137
Second, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II),138 the Court
created another substantive federal rule for punitive damages. 139 The case was
brought by the widow of a heavy cigarette smoker. 140 Without belaboring the
point, the record was, once again, egregious. 141 The Oregon jury issued a
punitive damages award of $79.5 million. 142 The trial judge reduced the award
to $32 million under the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence. 143 The Court of
Appeals of Oregon reinstated the jury verdict, and the Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed before the Court reversed in a five-to-four decision authored by Justice
Breyer. 144 Unlike its earlier excessiveness jurisprudence, the Court focused on
what it characterized as procedural, rather than substantive, due process
considerations and held that the Due Process Clause prohibits punitive damages
awards that punish a defendant for injury to “strangers to the litigation,”
although injury to others could be used to assess the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct. 145 The Court emphasized that permitting such punishment
132. Id. at 503.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 504.
135. Id. at 513.
136. See id. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See id.
138. 594 U.S. 346 (2007).
139. Id. at 353–55.
140. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Philip Morris I), 127 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Or. 2006).
141. See id. at 1168 (describing a coordinated campaign to convince the public that doubts remained
about whether smoking was damaging to health while being fully aware that there was no ambiguity
on that question, and finding evidence that the plaintiff specifically relied on the company’s published
statements in resisting his family’s urges to quit).
142. Id. at 1167.
143. Id. at 1171.
144. Philip Morris II, 594 U.S. at 350–52.
145. Id. at 353.
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“would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation,”
thereby exacerbating the “fundamental due process concerns” implicated in the
Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence. 146
The four dissenting justices emphasized different concerns but were
united in their view that the Court had improperly impeded on the Oregon
court’s proceedings. 147 The implicit lack of respect for the state court
proceedings was apparently not lost on the Oregon Supreme Court, which took
the opportunity on remand to unanimously reaffirm its own judgment. As
others have recounted, the Court granted certiorari in Philip Morris to correct
the Oregon court’s punitive damages award no fewer than three times before
finally throwing its hands up and dismissing the final grant of certiorari as
improvidently granted (after hearing argument on the case) in 2009. 148 The
$79.5 million award remained intact.
✦

✦

✦

In short, the story of punitive damages through the last thirty years is one
of increasing judicial centralization. By creating constitutional limits on
punitive damages, the Court has necessarily federalized those issues, 149 and the
Court’s procedural decisions regarding who gets to decide issues related to
punitive damages have shifted upward, towards the Court itself. Another way
to think about this phenomenon is in terms of expertise: the Court has
increasingly treated punitive damages as an appropriate subject for its own
expert judgment, and it has implicitly concluded that appellate judges—and,
especially, themselves—are the appropriate experts on the bounds of fairness in
this area. This raises an obvious question: Is that a good thing?

146. Id. at 354.
147. Justice Stevens noted the “egregious facts disclosed” by the record and critiqued the elusive
distinction between the permissible and impermissible uses of third-party injuries. Id. at 358 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas viewed the ostensibly procedural holding as “simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime,” which he would overrule. Id. at 361 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). And Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia, stressed that in vacating
the state supreme court’s award, the Court had ignored numerous procedural problems with Philip
Morris’s case and had “reache[d] outside the bounds of the case as postured when the trial court entered
its judgment” to enact the new rule. Id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She concluded, “I would
accord more respectful treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought
diligently to adhere to our changing, less than crystalline precedent.” Id.
148. Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 1, at 1759 n.6. For a fuller discussion of the dynamics of state
defiance in this area, see Sharkey, Federal Incursions, supra note 25, at 450.
149. For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, including a theory that the Court has focused on
punitive damages and has made fewer constitutional incursions into other areas of tort law, see Thomas
B. Colby, The Constitutionalization of Torts?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357–58 (2016).
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II. OUTCOMES, MORAL EXPERTISE, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Answering that question requires consideration of the virtues and vices of
judicial centralization. Judicial centralization takes multiple forms in this
context—it encompasses a shift in power from juries to judges, from trial judges
to appellate judges, and from states to the federal judiciary. Each shift reflects
a movement from more widely dispersed and closer-to-the-ground actors to a
narrower group exerting a form of top-down control. The normative
implications of centralization apply to these intertwined strands in different
ways. Still, the overarching phenomenon is striking and important—and worth
taking into account regardless of whether one agrees with the outcome of each
individual decision.
This section begins with a discussion of judicial centralization’s predictable
effect on the outcomes of punitive damages awards and, in particular, on the
outcome effects that seem to especially motivate the Supreme Court:
uniformity and predictability. While uniformity and predictability have virtues,
they also come with corresponding losses in the values associated with variation
and more deeply particularized consideration of cases. Next, the section turns
to the question of institutional competence. In most views, the assessment of
punitive damages requires not only factual determinations, but also at least
some element of moral assessment. 150 The question of which types of actors are
best situated to exercise this type of “moral expertise” is complex. On the whole,
neither the outcome dimension nor the institutional competence dimension
yields a definitive reason to favor or disfavor centralization—although the
analysis may place a strong thumb on the scale one way or the other for those
with strong priors on jurisprudential questions about tort law or the role of
courts.
A.

Centralization’s Systemic Outcomes
1. The Upside of Centralization: Uniformity and Predictability

First, centralization promotes uniformity. Uniformity has been the
apparent motivating concern behind much of the Court’s jurisprudence in this
area. On the few occasions where the justices have directly attempted to explain
the shift in authority away from ground-level actors, concerns about uniformity
and predictability have been at the forefront. In Gore, for instance, Justice
Breyer (joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter) wrote separately to explain
why the longstanding “presumption of validity” in jury verdicts was overcome
150. Even some law and economics scholars permit consideration of reprehensibility in limited
circumstances; Professors Polinski and Shavell, for instance, argue that an assessment of
reprehensibility may come into play when an individual (but not a corporate) defendant has acted
maliciously. Polinski & Shavell, supra note 3, at 905–06.
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in the case and explained that creating law, rather than relying on a
“decisionmaker’s caprice,” would help “assure the uniform general treatment of
similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself.” 151
The Gore guideposts themselves hint at this rationale. For instance, the
third guidepost, the relationship between the punitive damages award and other
types of penalties that could be imposed for similar conduct, considers concerns
about uniformity across cases, and in practice, lower courts have generally
applied the third guidepost by considering the punitive damages awards issued
in similar cases within their jurisdiction. The majority in Cooper used a similar
line of reasoning, offering that “de novo review tends to unify precedent” and
“stabilize the law.” 152 The scholarship has also picked up on this concern, and a
number of prominent commentators have argued that a perceived absence of
uniformity is the key problem that the Court’s jurisprudence does or should
seek to solve. 153
This uniformity operates across different dimensions. At the broadest
level, the Court’s constitutional limits supersede state legislation or common
law developments that allow for different considerations to play different roles
across the fifty states. In every jurisdiction in the country, both the Gore line of
cases’ “substantive” rules about what is excessive and Philip Morris’s
“procedural” rule limiting consideration of third-party harms supplant disparate
state law approaches. 154 One level down the chain, the shift from trial judges to
appellate judges with presumably broader cross-case perspectives is plainly
intended to promote uniformity, although there is some evidence that the
success of that effort has been mixed. 155 And there is a widespread belief,
obviously at play in the Court’s decision in Oberg and Exxon Shipping, that jury
decisions create greater variability than judge-made decisions—and, in
particular, that there is a greater tendency for juries to issue “outlier” awards. 156
151. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
152. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996)).
153. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV.
1, 1 (2009) (arguing that the reasoning in Exxon Valdez reveals that the Court’s efforts to rein in punitive
damages are motivated “not so much because of the size of the awards . . . but because of such awards’
perceived unpredictability”). For a trenchant criticism of the Court’s “undue confidence” in its
diagnosis of worrisome unpredictable jury awards, see Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation, supra note
1, at 38–46. Those who view punitive damages as serving a quasi-criminal role tend to express particular
concern on this front.
154. A number of scholars have commented on this “constitutionalization” or “federalization” of
punitive damages. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1558–67 (2009); Rustad, supra note 1, at 466.
155. See Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages: Clarity,
Consistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1276–315 (discussing inconsistencies in
the manner in which courts apply the guideposts).
156. The use of empirical and experimental data has been the subject of a lively debate. For perhaps
the most prominent presentation of empirical data on the argument, based on a series of controlled
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This last dimension has drawn the most attention, especially from
empiricists. 157 As Professors Theodore Eisenburg and Michael Heise
summarized, “After decades of dispute, it is now generally understood that the
bulk of punitive damages awards have been reasonably sober, modest in size,
and relatively stable over time, though some groups continue to question that
reality.” 158 And notably, in Exxon Shipping, the Court expressly disclaimed
reliance on some prominent scholarship that had been funded in part by Exxon
itself. 159 Although there are grounds for questioning the extent to which jury
awards reduce uniformity, for present purposes, we can assume that a shift to
judges promotes uniformity as the Court appears to believe.
So the question becomes: why is uniformity important in the context of
punitive damages? Uniformity might be good in and of itself—a sense that
similar cases will be treated similarly is, after all, deeply rooted in notions of
fairness. There is something profoundly disconcerting about the possibility that
the consequences of a tort depend on the luck of the draw. The principle that
like cases should be treated alike runs deep as a fairness norm. It is worth noting
that, even setting aside variation among decisionmakers, the principle is in
tension with the heavy dose of variability inherent in the tort system, in which
both damages questions—like what value to place on pain and suffering—and

experiments, that juries are likely to issue wildly divergent and irrational punitive damages awards, see
CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, at vii–2, 4–5, 17 (2002). This
landmark book, however, has been subject to heavy criticism both for its methodology and its normative
conclusions. See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
239, 246–47 (2003) (book review) (critiquing simulation technique underlying studies); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381, 383–84 (2003) (book review)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Should Juries Decide?]; Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform:
Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1359–60
(2005) (book review).
157. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 444–45 (2005) (discussing
cross-cutting problems with the validity of results obtained from experimental jury simulations that
lack real-world consequences); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Juries] (“The
relation between punitive and compensatory awards in jury trials is strikingly similar to the relation in
judge trials. For a given level of compensatory award, there is a greater range of punitive awards in
jury trials than in judge trials. The greater spread, however, produces trivially few jury awards that are
beyond the range of what judges might award in similar cases.”); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating
Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 493–96 (2005)
(describing a number of studies, some of which suggest that jury-made punitive damages awards will
have greater variation than judicially imposed awards and some of which found no difference).
158. Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who
Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 325–26 (2011).
159. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 n.17 (2007). For a discussion of the impact
of this remarkable footnote on academic scholarship, see Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic
Integrity and Legal Scholarship in the Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
33, 35–36 (2010).
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substantive questions—like whether a course of action was negligent—are
routinely left to juries and governed by common law. 160
Ultimately, the Court’s focus on uniformity is largely directed towards its
more practical counterpart, predictability. “The real problem,” Justice Souter
concluded in Exxon Shipping, “is the stark unpredictability of punitive
awards.” 161 In Exxon Shipping, the Court offered at least a surface-level
explanation: “[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so
that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some ability to know
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.” 162 In other
words, predictable punishments establish the incentives around which actors
can plan their behavior, which is, implicitly, an important role for law. 163
It is worth stopping to emphasize an important point: in general, punitive
damages may only be issued for intentional or reckless torts. 164 Why, one might
well ask, do we care if would-be-tortfeasors can plan out their intentional
wrongdoing with a clear-eyed view of the consequences? One answer might be
that, as a practical matter, we do not care whether tortfeasors behave recklessly
or intentionally, or merely negligently; we just want them to behave in the
economically optimal way, and punitive damages awards that are predictable
could create the right incentives to encourage that optimal behavior.
As a normative matter, whether this response makes sense depends on
one’s view of the purposes of tort law generally. Law and economics scholars,
for instance, have argued that the purpose of punitive damages—if any—is
simply to require actors to internalize the costs of their wrongdoing, and
punitive damages awards that are predictable may in some sense serve this
function. 165 Put differently, under the law and economics approach, punitive
damages essentially “perfect the cost-internalization strategy expressed in the
Hand Test.”166 The law and economics movement focuses, in particular, on
what’s known as “optimal deterrence”—the idea is that the sanction for
160. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 424–26 (1999).
161. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 499.
162. Id. at 502.
163. As Professor Jill Wieber Lens has explained, Justice Holmes’s “bad man” is a hypothetical
person who is impervious to moral judgment. Jill Wieber Lens, Justice Holmes’s Bad Man and the Depleted
Purposes of Punitive Damages, 101 KY. L.J. 789, 815 (2013) [hereinafter Lens, Justice Holmes’s]. It thus
makes no sense to talk about “punishment” because “punishment” would serve no purpose for such an
actor. Id.
164. For a discussion of what kinds of cases generally result in punitive damages, see Eisenberg et
al., The Decision To Award Punitive Damage Awards: An Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 577,
587–88, 598–600 (2010).
165. See Calandrillo, supra note 1 at 779 (explaining that the law and economics movement suggests
using punitive damages to create socially optimal deterrence, rather than arbitrary penalties so that
injurers will internalize the costs of their actions).
166. See Sebok, Normative Theories, supra note 1, at 317.
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wrongdoing should be set at a level that will promote the socially desirable level
of a particular behavior. 167 Some forms of well-calibrated punitive damages may
have a role in doing just that, especially if there is reason to think a tort will be
underdeterred without some form of supplemental penalty. 168 And in a wellfunctioning system, predictability may play an important role in allowing actors
to assess whether their actions are worth the costs.
From other perspectives within the tort scholarship, the role for
predictability is far less clear. In particular, if tort law is understood to
instantiate a system for dealing with wrongs,169 “optimal deterrence” is not the
name of the game, and allowing would-be tortfeasors to precisely calibrate the
likely costs of a violative course of action could well be counterproductive. 170 If
those in charge of a large corporation ran the math and decided that the
predictable costs of intentionally or recklessly injuring an individual was
economically rational, that would be all the more reason to impose a greater
punitive damages award. As Professors Galanter and Luban put it:
Only by imposing punitive damages of a different order from
compensatory damages can a jury convey the message that a norm is
categorical, that it demands compliance and not cost-benefit analysis.
The point is to make the numbers on the balance sheet so ridiculous that
the offender stops looking at the balance sheet. 171
To put the point somewhat differently, if one thinks that “total
deterrence,” rather than “optimal deterrence,” is the right framework for
intentional or reckless torts, then predictability undermines this aim. 172 The
167. See Calandrillo, supra note 1, at 779 (explaining that punitive damages should be viewed “as a
means of creating socially optimal deterrence and levels of care”).
168. See id. at 779–81; Polinksky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 890. For a normative argument that if
the purpose of punitive damages is simply deterrence, they fail on their own terms, see Sebok,
Normative Theories, supra note 1, at 316.
169. For more on these schools of thought, see supra note 3. The two understandings of tort law
are closely related, but their differences tend to be particularly salient in the context of punitive
damages. From a corrective justice standpoint, the aim of a tort suit is to return the victim to the
position he was in prior to being harmed; it stems from a sense that it is only just for a wrongdoer,
rather than an innocent victim, to bear the costs of a tort. See Calandrillo, supra note 1, at 779. Corrective
justice thus promotes a return to the status ex ante. Id. By contrast, under redress theory, tort law does
not seek to annul a misdeed; rather, it seeks to have the misdeed publicly acknowledged, to “assign
responsibility to a wrongdoer for having wronged the victim.” Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra
note 3, at 602; see also John C. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 925–26 (2010) (explaining that corrective justice theories understand tort law as being
fundamentally about “loss,” whereas the civil redress theory stresses tort law’s role as a law of
“wrongs”). Punitive damages are a considerably more natural outgrowth of redress theory.
170. See Markel, supra note 3, at 243.
171. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (1993).
172. Colby, supra note 2, at 471 (“[I]n an optimal deterrence regime, the actor ‘is entitled to harm
the victim so long as he pays for the harm (with the expectation that this entitlement will induce him
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whole point is to prevent people from making cost-benefit analyses that lead
them to violate their duties towards others.
As a jurisprudential matter, moreover, the focus on predictability is
somewhat baffling, except as a post-hoc justification for reducing large awards.
The Court’s substantive rules are a grab bag of limitations, drawn from
divergent theories of punitive damages, 173 but one thing that does seem clear is
that the Court has not fully adopted the type of deterrent approach adopted by
the law and economics movement. 174 For instance, the first and “perhaps the
most important” 175 Gore guidepost—reprehensibility—depends on factors like
the defendant’s mindset, which has little to do with the overall optimality of a
particular course of action. And in Cooper, before deciding that appellate courts
are better suited than trial judges to assess which awards are too large, the Court
engaged in a strikingly direct discussion of the scholarly literature before
squarely rejecting the idea that optimal deterrence was the relevant
consideration. 176 Indeed, many commentators have argued that the Court has
to take optimal care),’ whereas in a complete deterrence regime, the actor ‘is not entitled to harm the
victim even if [he] is willing to pay for that harm.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kenneth
W. Simmons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 (1996))).
173. For instance, within the Gore guideposts, the relationship to other penalties (guidepost three)
and the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (guidepost two) make sense within a framework
focused on deterring and regulating conduct in a law and economics sense, whereas the first is basically
anathema to that approach. See Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanada, The Foggy Road for Evaluating
Punitive Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
441, 442 (2004).
174. See Rustad, supra note 1, at 462 (describing the Court’s “microanalysis of punitive damages”
as “judicial miniaturism” and observing that the Court’s focus on individual retribution is evocative of
a “punitive damages puppeteer” akin to the puppeteer in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave). While I share in
some of the spirit of Professor Rustad’s work, the thrust of his argument is that the Court is myopically
focused on the retributive focus of punitive damages at the expense of other purposes, like public
deterrence. I am doubtful that the Court’s jurisprudence is sufficiently coherently theorized to even be
characterized as myopic—while there can be no doubt that the Court has not adopted a law and
economics approach full bore, its focus on predictability and the relationship between actual damages
and punitive damages are certainly evocative of that approach, and it seems clear that the Court is
attracted to it at a policy matter. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
438 (2001). Moreover, in my view—which I intend to expound in future work—even a notion of tort
law and punitive damages focused on retribution and redress can encompass some level of publicly
oriented deterrence. Individual plaintiffs who go through the difficulty of litigation and uncover
intentional abuses of power have a real, personal interest in feeling like the outcome of the litigation
will not simply be for the wrongdoing to be “costed out,” leaving the guilty defendant in a position
where from his or her perspective it may make sense to continue with the wrongdoing.
175. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
176. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439–40. After expressly engaging with Professors Polinksy and Shavell’s
article and a Judge Calibresi opinion espousing a similar approach, the Court explained that “deterrence
is not the only purpose served by punitive damages.” Id. at 438–39. Even with respect to deterrence,
the Court explained that “it is not at all obvious” that this purpose can be served only by an “optimal
deterrence” approach. Id. at 439. The Court went on to explain that “[c]itizens and legislators may
rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what
they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is
just one consideration among many.” Id.
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gone too far in prioritizing the “punitive,” revenge-oriented aspect of the
Court’s jurisprudence at the expense of deterrence interests. 177
None of this is to say that predictability and uniformity are irrelevant. It
seems clear that there is some basic virtue at stake in the idea that like cases
should be treated alike, and centralization undoubtedly promotes that to at least
some extent—although in this context, it notably does so only by reducing large
awards. At a broad level, however, the question is whether these values are
sufficiently great to overcome the other implications of increased
centralization—including the values that are promoted by the absence of
predictability and uniformity.
2. The Downsides of Centralization: Loss of Variation and Particularity
The flipside of uniformity is variation—and the concomitant value of
particularity. Equally obvious, the practical consequence of highly variable
punitive damages awards is a decrease in predictability.
This takes at least two forms. First, and more obviously, is the form of
variability that arises because different decisionmakers (juries or judges at
different levels or jurisdictions) are inclined to treat the same case differently.
This is the downside of the standard fairness principle described above. This
type of variation may be the result of mere chance—if, for instance, judicial
decisions vary based on what the judge had for breakfast. 178 In that sort of
circumstance, it is difficult to argue for variation on its own terms (except to
the extent that the resultant lack of predictability may serve a deterrent function
as discussed above). Two different juries may produce different punitive
damages awards—and as noted above, there is some indication that juries
ultimately issue punitive damages awards with a higher overall variance. 179
But an analogous type of variation can also have important, and
underrecognized, upsides. In particular, differences across jurisdictions or
across decisionmakers are not necessarily bad things. Variation across states, for
instance, allows states to serve their long-acknowledged role as “laboratories of
democracies.” 180 As it currently stands, the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence
would seem to prohibit a wide range of possible legislative approaches
authorizing especially high punitive damages awards for certain kinds of
177. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 1, at 462; Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note
2, at 363; see also Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation, supra note 1, at 27 (“By elevating a single
punitive damages goal—that of retributive punishment—the Court sets the stage for a clash between
state courts and legislatures that might be inspired to define their legitimate state interests in punitive
damages differently.”).
178. This idea is widely, but probably apocryphally, attributed to Jerome Frank. See Brian Leiter,
American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL THEORY (M.
Golding & W. Edmundson eds., 2005).
179. See Eisenberg et al., Juries, supra note 157, at 617.
180. See Klass, supra note 154, at 1576.
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egregious misconduct, perhaps upon specific findings, and so it would be
difficult to tell what type of policy impact such rules have.
More broadly, different localities have different interests they may seek to
vindicate with punitive damages. As Professor Rustad put it, “Punitive damages
vindicate different interests in a state with a large agricultural sector than in one
where software licensing, high technology, or Internet businesses drive the state
economy.” 181 But the point applies more narrowly: even setting aside
differences in state laws, variations in awards by juries in different communities
within a state may reflect different practical interests and moral intuitions
across those communities. If a defendant has interactions in multiple
communities, it is not clear from a normative perspective why they should not
be, to at least some extent, accountable to the norms of those communities. And
it is even less clear that a centralized decisionmaking body in Washington, D.C.,
has much to add to that judgment. More straightforwardly, variability at the
jurisdictional level gives people more options, to the extent they can choose
where to do business or live.
Second, variability may result not from different decisionmakers but from
different underlying circumstances in the case. A rich form of particularity
requires room for variation. In short, cases that seem similar from ten thousand
feet can be, on the ground, quite different. Indeed, the very example that the
Supreme Court invoked as “anecdotal evidence” that variation is a problem
illustrates the point. 182 In Exxon Shipping, the Court relayed the following about
Gore:
One of our own leading cases on punitive damages, with a $4 million
verdict by an Alabama jury, noted that a second Alabama case with
strikingly similar facts produced “a comparable amount of compensatory
damages” but “no punitive damages at all.” As the Supreme Court of
Alabama candidly explained, “the disparity between the two jury verdicts
. . . [w]as a reflection of the inherent uncertainty of the trial process.” 183
But even a surface review of the two cases the Court cites reveals a critical
difference: in only one of the cases did the plaintiffs adduce evidence that the
misconduct was intentional—an absolutely critical question in assessing the
appropriateness or amount of punitive damages. The “inherent uncertainty of
the trial process” that the Alabama court referred to is not a story about
irrational juries—it’s a story about the fact that not every civil case will uncover
equivalent evidence of wrongdoing. 184 Recall that in State Farm, an expert
181. Rustad, supra note 1, at 523.
182. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500–01 (2007).
183. Id. (alteration in original) (omission in original) (first quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 525 n.8 (1996); and then quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 626
(Al. 1994) (per curiam)).
184. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 626 (Al. 1994) (per curiam).
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testified that evidence of the insurance company’s intentional, nationwide
scheme would be discovered in approximately one out of fifty thousand cases. 185
Cases, of course, can be different in ways that are subtler than that. When
it comes to evaluating each case in its full richness, the actors closest to the
ground—juries and trial judges—have a dramatic advantage. As the dissent in
Cooper stressed, the Court has itself acknowledged that “[t]rial judges have the
unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the living courtroom context,
. . . while appellate judges see only the cold paper record.” 186
This is especially so when questions turn on credibility, which tend to be
of particular importance in questions of intent or motive—issues that are crucial
to the assessment of punitive damages. But even beyond credibility
determinations—no matter how strong an appellate judge’s grip on the record
or how good her clerk—hours spent with a binder of transcripts cannot possibly
bring a case alive with the richness of being present at an actual trial. 187 The
appellate court “is more removed from the vagaries and sympathies that arise
from the trial process.” 188 And appellate courts, most especially the Supreme
Court, may well be tempted to establish broadly applicable rules even when
adjudicating particularized disputes. 189 In its ideal form, the common law
system, coupled with appellate review, leads to the emergence of responsive,
fact-specific rules that come about from the proper resolution of particularized
cases. But on the margins, decisions made with an eye towards establishing the
correct rule for future cases to follow may shortchange the particular facts of a
case that caused a jury or trial judge to issue a particularly high award. Writing
a useful and generalizable opinion, in other words, may come at the expense of
particularity, even if only in subtle ways.
More broadly, particularity is a deeply embedded norm in most
conceptions of tort law, which is replete with rules like the eggshell skull rule
and overwhelmingly fact-sensitive standards that govern everything from
proximate cause to reasonableness. Under the relational theory of tort law,
where the dignity of the injured is of particular concern, this makes sense.
Arguably, punitive damages play a meaningfully different role than these other
fact-sensitive tort questions. In Cooper, for instance, the Court concluded that
185. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003).
186. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 445 (2001) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
187. See generally, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 54 (2018) (“Each individual dispute, in turn, can be addressed
with specific care and concern by the judge and jury who evaluate it. Broad principles structure the
resolution of the dispute, but the court remains equipped to take account of individual nuances in every
case.”).
188. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 952
(2006).
189. See id.
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de novo appellate review of punitive damages is acceptable under the Seventh
Amendment because the appropriate sanction is more of a moral question than
a factual one. 190 But particularization seems just as important in evaluating the
totality of a defendant’s actions as in deciding more obviously factual questions
about the sequence of events or the defendant’s intention, to the extent that
those concepts can be separated at all in practice. 191 In making that evaluation,
the advantage in institutional competency surely belongs to the entities closest
to the ground.
B.

Institutional Competence and Moral Expertise
1. Legal Perspective vs. Community Norms

Uniformity, of course, is not the same as “getting it right.” And so even if
uniformity may have virtue in any legal context, another corresponding
drawback is that a uniform approach can be uniformly wrong. Centralization
promotes the implementation of a single, unified vision. In some sense, what
the Supreme Court has done over the last few decades is implement its vision
of punitive damages and create a more centralized structure for implementing
that vision. And the Court has been largely successful in that effort. 192 Whether
that vision is a desirable one as a substantive matter depends upon one’s policy
preferences and, perhaps, on empirical questions beyond the scope of this paper.
From a more systemic perspective, however, the more important question is
whether there is reason to think that the Court is so well-suited to addressing
the normative issues at stake in punitive damages that its vision should supplant
those of other decisionmakers.
In other words, to what extent do judges, and especially the Court, have a
claim to “moral expertise” that suggests that their vision of the purposes and
limits of punitive damages should win? This is a difficult question, one that goes
to the heart of the question of what the role of the judiciary is. There is not a
definitive answer to these broad questions, but it is worth taking a serious look
at the threads most relevant to the context at hand.
190. See Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 17, at 164–65, 178 (arguing persuasively
that the historical understanding on which the Court based this line of argument was entirely
incorrect).
191. See Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort Law’s Influence on Defining the Constitutional
Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 621–22 (2011) [hereinafter Lens,
Punishing for the Injury] (arguing that the Court’s focus on consistency is inconsistent with the private
tort law conception that the Court has seemed to adopt in other respects).
192. See, e.g., N. William Hines, Marching to a Different Drummer: Are Lower Courts Faithfully
Implementing the Evolving Due Process Guideposts To Catch and Correct Excessive Punitive Damage Award?,
62 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 401–02 (reviewing five hundred cases and concluding that there is some
variation in how lower courts interpret the Gore guideposts in particular circumstances; on the whole,
lower courts carry out the spirit of the guideposts with little resistance).
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As an initial matter, as compared to state courts, federal courts have a
unique institutional perspective with respect to issues that are national in scope
or effect. 193 State courts, by contrast, are closer to the issues that affect their
states’ populations. The examples adduced by Professor Rustad put the point
in sharp focus:
A jury in Alabama, for example, awarded punitive damages in a case
where a large agribusiness firm systematically cheated hundreds of
chicken farmers by underweighing their chickens. Arizona, which has a
large health-oriented population, imposes punitive damages by statute
for willful misconduct in health spa contracts. California places a high
value on the confidentiality of medical information, and provides
punitive damages for unlawful disclosure by providers. California, as the
center of the U.S. entertainment industry, also imposes punitive
damages for the unauthorized commercial use of a deceased personality’s
name, voice, or likeness. California uses the sanction of punitive damages
to protect its considerable fine art holdings from being altered or
destroyed, and finally, the remedy of punitive damages for rent
skimming protects the large numbers of new immigrants to California. 194
A less-local court system would surely be less likely to appreciate the
particular repugnance with which local juries might view these sorts of industryspecific harms. More generally, even setting aside discrete issues along these
lines, state courts may be more focused on issues that specifically affect the
general public in their states, rather than focusing on a more systemic or abstract
view of the law. For better or for worse, this phenomenon may be heightened
by the extent to which state judges may be elected or appointed through more
politically responsive processes.
As compared to the population at large, federal courts—and the Supreme
Court in particular—are different in at least two broad, salient categories. 195
193. In this Article, I do not take up the quite difficult questions of how to deal with the
extraterritorial impact that large punitive damages in one state may have, which has been discussed at
length by others. Professor Sharkey, in particular, has argued that a major role the Court should play is
in preventing states from attempting to legislate across state lines. See, e.g., Sharkey, Federal Incursions,
supra note 25, at 455–56. For another nuanced discussion of this phenomenon, see Samuel Issacharoff
& Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1420–28 (2006).
194. Rustad, supra note 1, at 523.
195. For a theory of when juries are and should be permitted to make normative judgments, see
Gergen, supra note 160, at 417. Gergen argues that a key driver of when juries are permitted to make
normative decisions is whether the issue implicates economic interests as opposed to physical personal
interests. See id. at 413 (“While we are willing to let ordinary intuitive morality define obligation in
the personal sphere, a different, more instrumental morality reigns in the economic sphere.”). Gergen
does not take up the question of punitive damages, but it is worth noting that some courts that do
consider seemingly economic injuries in punitive damages cases have suggested that economic injuries,
and perhaps especially intentional ones, may be more akin to physical injuries in some cases. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Campbell III), 98 P.3d 409, 415 (Utah 2004) (“As the
facts of this case make clear, misconduct which occurs in the insurance sector of the economic realm is
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First is the professional dimension. It seems fair to assume that legal training
and judicial experience make judges better at some forms of moral reasoning. 196
In particular, judges are better at making decisions that are more “prudential”
or made with an eye towards how the case at hand fits in with the other cases. 197
Judges may encounter a wide array of different forms of wrongdoing, have a
broad perspective on the penalties that are available or ordinarily imposed, and
are trained to consider questions like what the precedential value of a decision
(in a formal or informal sense) will have on other cases and the public at large. 198
Juries are often said to be more likely to make “emotional” decisions. 199 This
arguably cuts in both directions: to the extent that one role of the jury is to
serve as the conscience of society, it is unclear why some level of emotion would
be categorically inappropriate in assessing the gravity of harms.
Judges are also systematically different from the public in other respects.
The Supreme Court, in particular, is whiter, more male, older, and wealthier
than the general population as are federal trial and appellate judges. 200 State
court judges are also disproportionately white and, especially, male, 201 and it
seems reasonable to assume that as lawyers, they also systematically differ from
the populations they serve in regard to wealth, class, or educational dimensions.
It is at least plausible that such demographic differences affect the way that the
likely to cause injury more closely akin to physical assault or trauma than to mere economic loss. When
an insurer callously betrays the insured’s expectation of peace of mind, as State Farm did to the
Campbells, its conduct is substantially more reprehensible than, for example, the undisclosed
repainting of an automobile which spawned the punitive damages award in Gore.”).
196. For a discussion of the unique moral perspective that lawyers have, see Joseph William Singer,
Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 936–48 (2009).
197. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 160, 415–16.
198. For a systematic account of relevant differences between judges and juries, see David A.
Logan, Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 903, 915–27 (2015).
199. See, e.g., Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
179, 183 (1998) (“Judges are less susceptible to emotional factors, less likely to be unduly influenced by
a defendant’s wealth, more experienced in imposing punishment, and more knowledgeable of the
punishment imposed in other cases.”).
200. See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT
AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILES OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 1, 4, 15 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB8S-PWBL]. As of June 2017, women
comprised 37% of circuit court judges and 34% of district court judges (as compared to 33% of the
Supreme Court, and 51% of the population). Id. Seventy-five percent (75%) of circuit court judges and
71% of district court judges were white (non-Hispanic), as compared to seven-ninths (around 78%) of
the Supreme Court and 60% of the population. Id. Also, as of 2017, the Center for Public Integrity
noted that at least six, and possibly all nine, of the Supreme Court justices were millionaires, with
Justice Breyer’s net worth in the range of at least $5 million and Chief Justice Roberts’ net worth above
$2.5 million. See David Levinthal, Lateshia Beachum & Carrie Levine, Supreme Court a Millionaire’s
Club, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 22, 2017), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/supremecourt-a-millionaires-club [https://perma.cc/FZN3-N7ST].
201. See generally Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgment on
State Courts?, GAVEL GAP, https://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5HH32WC] (finding that 57% of state trial court judges are white men).
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judges view punitive damages cases. 202 As noted above, well-entrenched cultural
narratives state that juries are predisposed to be biased against wealthy or
corporate defendants. 203 But saying that these decisionmakers treat different
types of defendants differently tells us little about which approach is right.
The Courts’ elite makeup may affect its sympathy for particular parties,
and not necessarily always in a negative way. Assume, for instance, that
Supreme Court justices—having generally graduated from Harvard or Yale
Law Schools—are more likely to personally know executives in major, national
corporations. It may well be that this gives them a more realistic understanding
of the types of pressures corporate defendants and high-level employees
experience at a human level—how easy, for instance, it can be for a perfectly
normal person to focus on their own professional goals without taking a broader
view of the impact on society, or how frustrating (and easy) it might be to have
a corporate cost-cutting measure be construed by underlings as pressure to
engage in more egregious misconduct. And they may indeed be less likely to
villainize white-collar defendants simply because they work for banks and be
sympathetic to the possibility that those in seemingly privileged places can face
any number of outside anxieties and pressures. It would not necessarily be an
injustice if a decisionmaker had a more realistic understanding of these sorts of
issues.
But the downside of this story is clear. If the norms of “elites” running
major businesses are out of sync with how the rest of society thinks that business
should work, that could just as easily be an argument that there is a greater need
for mechanisms by which the less powerful can make that clear. 204 And the
flipside of the impulse to interpret a certain type of defendant generously is the
tendency to overlook evidence that the defendant at hand was actually pretty

202. See generally Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of
District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (2005).
203. One possible justification for preferring the judiciary relates to a cultural narrative that juries
are especially hostile to the wealthy, the idea being that wealthy or corporate defendants should thus
be analogized to other disfavored minorities who receive extra protection from courts. An argument
along these lines would have more persuasive force if it turned out that evidence bore this out. But the
existing literature suggests that juries by and large make decisions very much like judges. Robbennolt,
supra note 157, at 493–96. And even assuming that juries systematically issued larger awards against
such defendants than did judges, that could simply mean that juries have a more fervent view that even
large corporations should be held to account for violating their duties to the public. Because deterrence
is one of the stated purposes of punitive damages awards, the fact that juries may issue larger awards
against wealthier defendants (whether corporations or individuals) does not by itself suggest bias. See
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damage Awards, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 628–
29 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., The Predictability]. See generally Valerie P. Hans & William S.
Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate,
26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85 (1992) (collecting evidence that juries are not biased against big businesses).
And so, we return to the question: Who gets to decide?
204. See infra text accompanying notes 244–56.
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darn bad—a form of confirmation bias. 205 Notably, judges do not seem to be
friendlier than juries to defendants across the board. One study, for instance,
indicated that judges are more likely to impose the death penalty than are
juries. 206
2. State Farm: A Case Study
Take State Farm as a case study. The jury entered a punitive award of $145
million; the trial judge felt bound by Gore to reduce the award to $25 million,
but the Utah Supreme Court, reviewing the rather egregious trial record,
concluded that $145 million was indeed an appropriate punishment. 207 Yet a
majority of the justices on the Supreme Court indicated that, at most, a punitive
award amounting to a “single-digit multiplier” of the compensatory damages
award ($1 million) was appropriate. 208 On remand, the Supreme Court of Utah
imposed an award at the top end of the permissible range, roughly $9 million, 209
ignoring the Court’s suggestion that a one-to-one ratio was “perhaps” 210 the
maximum allowable award when compensatory damages are substantial. 211
What should be made of the Court’s radical disagreement with the jury
and state court judges about whether $145 million was wildly out of bounds of
justice or, instead, entirely reasonable? One answer may lie in prudential
concerns: the Court, for instance, was obviously concerned about the
downstream effects of such a large award (especially if such awards became
common) and its effect on other states, which seems like a concern uniquely
within the competence of the federal courts in general and the Court in
particular. Along the same lines, the Court may have viewed the lower courts
as insufficiently sensitive to the harms that would befall other State Farm
insureds if the company were to go out of business. 212 Or perhaps the different
205. See Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence White, Educating Judges and Lawyers in Behavioral
Research: A Case Study, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 159, 179–81 (2017).
206. See AARYN URELL, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA:
JUDGE OVERRIDE 1, 14–16 (2011), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/death-penalty-in-alabama-judgeoverride.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BKR-A59J].
207. Campbell III, 98 P.3d 409, 411 (Utah 2004).
208. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2004).
209. Campbell III, 98 P.3d at 420.
210. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 425–26 (“The compensatory award in this case was substantial . . . .”).
211. While the state court’s approach to the remand after State Farm was not quite so bold as the
Oregon court’s response after Philip Morris, it is nevertheless hard to miss a note of frustration. See
Campbell III, 98 P.3d at 412 (“By assigning to us the duty to resolve the issue of punitive damages by
fixing an award, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to vest in us some discretion to exercise our
independent judgment to reach a reasonable and proportionate award.”); id. at 413 (“As long as the
Supreme Court stands by its view that punitive damages serve a legitimate means to satisfy a state’s
objectives to punish and deter behavior which it deems unlawful or tortious based on its own values
and traditions, it would seemingly be bound to avoid creating and imposing on the states a nationwide
code of personal and corporate behavior.”).
212. See Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 428.
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result was driven by a different level of immersion in the facts or different levels
of deference towards the actors who were most deeply engaged with the facts.
On the other side, perhaps the jury was, as the Court feared, punishing State
Farm for being an “unsavory business,” rather than for its conduct. 213
Ultimately, however, it is hard to read the majority opinion without a
sense that the Court simply did not view State Farm’s conduct as reprehensible
to anywhere near the extent of the jury or the state judges. As the Utah Supreme
Court put it on remand:
In this instance, we find the blameworthiness of State Farm’s behavior
toward the Campbells to be several degrees more offensive than the
Supreme Court’s less than condemnatory view that State Farm’s
behavior “merits no praise” . . . . As the facts of this case make clear,
misconduct which occurs in the insurance sector of the economic realm
is likely to cause injury more closely akin to physical assault or trauma
than to mere economic loss. When an insurer callously betrays the
insured’s expectation of peace of mind, as State Farm did to the
Campbells, its conduct is substantially more reprehensible than, for
example, the undisclosed repainting of an automobile which spawned the
punitive damages award in Gore. 214
It seems that what the Court viewed as routine corporate delinquency, the
jury and state courts viewed as a profoundly destructive and a foundational
betrayal. And State Farm is hardly unique in this respect. 215 Whether this is the
213. Id. at 423.
214. Campbell III, 98 P.3d at 413, 415.
215. In Exxon Shipping, for instance, Justice Breyer’s dissent laid out the extent to which the
Supreme Court was simply substituting its own judgment for that of many (albeit in the context of
reviewing federal, rather than state court, judgments):
The jury thought that the facts here justified punitive damages of $5 billion. The District
Court agreed. It “engaged in an exacting review” of that award “not once or twice, but three
times, with a more penetrating inquiry each time,” the case having twice been remanded for
reconsideration in light of Supreme Court due process cases that the District Court had not
previously had a chance to consider. And each time it concluded “that a $5 billion award was
justified by the facts of this case,” based in large part on the fact that “Exxon’s conduct was
highly reprehensible,” and it reduced the award (slightly) only when the Court of Appeals
specifically demanded that it do so.
When the Court of Appeals finally took matters into its own hands, it concluded that the facts
justified an award of $2.5 billion. It specifically noted the “egregious” nature of Exxon’s
conduct. And, apparently for that reason, it believed that the facts of the case “justifie[d] a
considerably higher ratio” than the 1:1 ratio we had applied in our most recent due process
case and that the Court adopts here.
I can find no reasoned basis to disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that this is a
special case, justifying an exception from strict application of the majority’s numerical rule.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 526 (2008) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citations omitted).
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result of the higher court’s broader-minded judicial perspective, the
contingencies of the particular personalities on the two courts at hand, or
systematic selection criteria that make it likely that the justices on the Supreme
Court are likely to have a series of life experiences quite different from most
others, it puts in stark relief the extent to which disparate moral impressions
can drive the limits placed on punitive awards. 216 And yet it does not answer
the question of whose judgment should govern.
✦

✦

✦

Taking this all together, we are left in something of an equipoise: juries
and judges have different reasonable claims to different relevant institutional
competencies, and uniformity and predictability have advantages as well as real
costs in this area. The different weight one may place on the different factors
will likely turn primarily on one’s views of larger tort theory or on broad
jurisprudential questions, such as the judiciary’s role in protecting wealthy
defendants. For instance, to the extent punitive damages are a legitimate
opportunity for communities to express moral outrage, either on behalf of
society or on behalf of an individual victim, then all in all, centralization seems
like the wrong direction—but to the extent that the imposition of damages is
more of a technocratic exercise intended to promote an ideal level of behavior,
it seems less so. And to the extent one views the judiciary, as opposed to jurors,
as the best arbiters of fairness, whether for countermajoritarian or other reasons,
centralization might seem like the best approach. But if the purpose of tort law
is to allow for the vindication of violations of community norms, then the
opposite result is reached.
III. VOICE: DECENTRALIZATION’S INDEPENDENT GOOD
In sum, considering judicial centralization of punitive damages on the
dimensions of jurisprudential aims and institutional competence sheds some
light on its contours but does not provide an especially clear bottom line
regarding whether it is desirable. And so, this Article turns next to a discussion
of a third dimension: the relationship between this judicial centralization and
democratic values like self-authorship and voice. On this dimension, I argue
there is clear reason for concern about judicial centralization. 217
Understanding the stakes requires taking stock of how judicial
centralization in the punitive damages domain connects with broader trends.
Consolidation and federalization are increasingly the norm across a wide swath
216. See Eisenberg et al., The Predictability, supra note 203, at 628–29; see also Hans & Lofquist,
supra note 203, at 87 (collecting evidence that juries are not biased against big businesses).
217. I like to think that De Tocqueville would agree. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 90 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., 2002) (1835) (“What I
admire most in America are not the administrative effects of decentralization but its political effects.”).
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of the law. 218 Even within the traditionally diffuse realm of tort law, as
Professors Golderberg and Zipursky have argued, the Supreme Court has
effectively created a federal law of torts in a number of respects beyond punitive
damages, controverting the spirit of Erie and the hornbook story that there is
no federal common law. 219 A parallel phenomenon could be said to describe
much of modern life. Amazon—which reportedly controls nearly half of the
online retail market in the United States 220—now also owns Whole Foods.
Google (or, rather, Alphabet) is undertaking an array of ambitious healthcare
projects. 221 After advocates’ intense efforts over years, it has recently come to
light that AT&T adds four billion records of consumers’ phone calls per day to
a surveillance program called Hemisphere, which is run in concert with the
federal government. 222 Not only is this fusion of power happening, in some
instances it can be happening behind the scenes in ways that are extremely
difficult for the public to find out about. 223
At the same time, less powerful individuals—along with the government
itself—have been increasingly unable to exert control over the large entities that

218. For a discussion of a phenomenon notably similar to the judicial centralization I discuss here
in the context of personal jurisdiction rules, see Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on
Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1251, 1253 (2018) (demonstrating that a recent Supreme Court decision on personal jurisdiction has led
to the consolidation of federal lawsuits on defendant-friendly terms, and that as a result, “even more
power over mass-tort litigation will be centralized in the hands of” federal multi-district litigation
judges). See also JACOB LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, FREEDOM 26 (2014) (discussing the
“revitalized interest in federalism in a number of constitutional democracies”); Samuel Issacharoff &
Florencia Marrotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed out Common Law, N.Y.U. PUB. L. & RES. SERIES 1, 1 (Oct.
5, 2018) (demonstrating that the proportion of litigation handled in federal, rather than state, courts
has increased dramatically, and the related rise in the relative prevalence of class actions); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 227 (2007); Alexandra Lahav, The New Privity 53–57 (July 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3413349
[https://perma.cc/DDE2-SY9T]
(describing Court’s jurisdictional “power grab”).
219. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the
Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2016).
220. Josh Dzieza, Prime and Punishment: Dirty Dealing in the $175 Billion Amazon Marketplace,
VERGE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/19/18140799/amazon-marketplace-scamsseller-court-appeal-reinstatement [https://perma.cc/DQM6-GYTN].
221. Healthcare and Biosciences, GOOGLE AI, https://ai.google/healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/
4SDW-PYUY].
222. Dave Mass, Before and After: What We Learned About the Hemisphere Program After Suing the
DEA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (DEC. 19, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/andafter-what-we-learned-about-hemisphere-program-after-suing-dea [https://perma.cc/SPU8-5XM7].
223. See Hemisphere: Law Enforcement’s Secret Call Records Deal with AT&T, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/hemisphere [https://perma.cc/MZ8D-CGA6]
(explaining that Hemisphere only became public by serendipity—and detailing practices such as
“parallel subpoenas” intended to prevent the program from ever being disclosed—and that AT&T’s
contract with the Drug Enforcement Agency prohibited the government from discussing the program’s
existence).
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seem to run the world. 224 Some part of this phenomenon is surely attributable
to broad economic and global trends. 225 But it is also directly traceable to the
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, which has affirmatively disabled the
legislative branch’s efforts to protect the political process and made it harder
for less affluent or powerful entities to affect corporate interests. By way of
example, in Citizens United v. FEC, 226 the Court held Congress’s efforts to
restrain corporate influence in the political process unconstitutional. 227 The
predictable result has been a dramatic influx of corporate money into politics. 228
In Shelby County v. Holder, 229 the Court held that an overwhelmingly popular
provision of the Voting Rights Act, which prevented jurisdictions with
particularly poor historical records of discrimination in elections from changing
their election laws without going through a preclearance procedure, was likewise
unconstitutional. 230 The predictable outcome was that most of the covered
jurisdictions have since enacted restrictive laws making it harder for minorities
to vote. 231 In the economic realm, the Court has put up significant roadblocks
to other mechanisms that allow average individuals to band together in response
to corporate power, such as unions 232 and class actions. 233
We might hope that some combination of corporate responsibility, fear of
negative publicity, genuine goodwill, and what legal restrictions remain would
prevent egregious behavior—and in most instances, they probably do. But every
year brings news of disasters caused by corporations that, it seems, should have
done better. The examples in the Court’s own jurisprudence are telling: a
known alcoholic is permitted to drive an oil supertanker through a fragile
ecosystem 234; tobacco executives engage in a decades-long misinformation
campaign 235; a major insurance company has a corporate-wide scheme to

224. For a powerful discussion of this phenomenon, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet:
The Courts’ Role in Eroding ‘We the People’s’ Ability To Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 423, 432 (2016) (arguing that the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence across a range of areas
has fundamentally shifted the relationship between corporations and society).
225. Amazon’s recent headlines-making headquarters selection process put the practical power and
influence that such enormously important economic forces can have into high focus. See, e.g., Anand
Giridharadas, The New York Hustle of Amazon’s Second Headquarters, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-new-york-hustle-of-amazons-secondheadquarters [perma.cc/XXW2-UV95].
226. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
227. Id. at 319.
228. See Strine, supra note 224, at 426.
229. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
230. Id. at 557.
231. Strine, supra note 224, at 446–47.
232. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
233. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).
234. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008).
235. See Philip Morris I, 127 P.3d 1165, 1168–69 (Or. 2006).

98 N.C. L. REV. 315 (2020)

356

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

defraud its customers. 236 But those cases do not seem to be isolated. A
pharmaceutical company, allegedly, intentionally hides the addictiveness of
opioids. 237 Facebook’s failure to address the use of its platform by foreign
powers may or may not have swung the 2016 presidential election. 238
Additionally, what to major entities may seem like little more than sloppy
business practices may seriously affect individual lives and communities, in both
dramatic and subtle ways. Problems with Amazon’s bureaucratic “court” for
assessing fake user reviews put small companies out of business. 239 Facebook’s
secret experimentation with users’ moods, which intentionally exposed some
users to sadder content, affected millions. 240 The extent of damage that
genuinely malicious intent at high levels could wreak is enormous, and it is far
from clear that such wrongdoing will be predictably uncovered.
None of this is to say that larger or more centralized corporations are
better or worse than smaller ones, or that this centralization is not preferable on
a macro-level. The point is simply that even if this centralization is a good thing
for the economy or society at large, a predictable consequence of it is a sense of
increasing alienation from forces that govern even the most intimate parts of
their lives. This is true even if such entities misbehave less than mom-and-pop
shops (although as the above examples indicate, even if that’s true, the impact
of any such misbehavior could be much greater).
In light of all of this, there is good reason for the proverbial “little guy” to
fear that possibilities for meaningful voice are on the decline. This effect is only
compounded by heightened levels of socioeconomic stratification. 241 Wealth
concentration, in particular, is associated with “sociopolitical malaise” and
democratic dysfunction because of the extent to which it gives disproportionate
political voice to the affluent. 242 And there is good reason to think that this

236. See Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003).
237. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., No. 1884-CV-01808-BLS2, 2019 WL
939120, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019); see also supra note 10.
238. Jane Mayer, Review, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, NEW YORKER (Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-swing-theelection-for-trump [perma.cc/73SL-Y455] (discussing KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR:
HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT—WHAT WE DON’T, CAN’T,
AND DO KNOW (2018)).
239. Dzieza, supra note 220.
240. Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood Manipulation Experiment,
ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-weknow-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/ [perma.cc/8L3P-GMYL].
241. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993,
998–1012 (2004) (describing the dramatic increase in the stratification of wealth between 1979 and
2000).
242. See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 826 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 827, 840–50
(2001).
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diminishment of voice is important for the welfare of both individuals and
society. 243
What does this all have to do with punitive damages? In short, regardless
of one’s take on these macro trends, if we care about individuals’ and
communities’ ability to meaningfully engage with the world, then this is the
wrong time to shift control over damage awards towards a narrower class of elite
experts. And it is even more concerning for the force behind any such shift to
be the least representative branch.
Tort suits are in some sense a means for developing and articulating
norms. 244 In practice, punitive damages are a means of giving those norms teeth
when violated by the powerful and affluent and, in particular, to push back
against the implicit message that the wrongdoer is somehow more valuable than
the victim or is entitled to treat the victim poorly. 245 Both punitive awards and
settlements negotiated in their shadow tend to target dominant parties. 246 In
many parts of the legal system, defendants can deflect blame by casting
plaintiffs as overly litigious and the legal system as overly technical. That is
much harder in the face of a dramatic punitive damages award, rendering
punitive damages “perhaps the most important instrument in the legal
repertoire for pronouncing moral disapproval of economically formidable
offenders.” 247 To be sure, the possibility that corporations get larger and more
national in scope might well warrant corresponding national regulation in some
domains. Any such shift, however, should be the product of our political
process—such lawmaking is emphatically not the province of the courts. To say
that because corporations have gotten so large that communities have difficulty
engaging them, the judiciary should weaken the power of traditional forms of
community voice seems to have things precisely backwards.
The downsides of judicial centralization are most stark when it comes at
the cost of jury control. In times past, juries were understood as a foundational
aspect of democratic participation, and accorded significant control and respect;
De Tocqueville, for instance, considered the jury “the most energetic means of
making the people reign,” and recognized the role that the exercise of jury
participation has on the jurors themselves. 248 As others have recounted, the
243. See generally DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 217, at 56–92 (discussing the importance of local
participation and control to the “spirit of freedom”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE (2006) (explaining that a sense of
procedural justice engenders a sense of legitimacy, which generates buy-in and voluntary cooperation).
244. Kysar, supra note 187, at 54 (arguing that common law tort actions can be a “decentralized and
citizen-empowering means” of bringing to light the concrete harms imposed on private plaintiffs).
245. Galanter & Luban, supra note 171, at 1432.
246. Id. at 1426.
247. Id. at 1428.
248. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 217, at 262 (“I do not know if the jury is useful to those who
have lawsuits, but I am sure that it is very useful to those who judge them.”).
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jury’s standing—and its practical power—has dramatically diminished over
time. But it remains the case that juries are uniquely positioned to deliver a
message from the community, if we let them. 249 As Professor Lahav has argued,
to the extent that shifting authority away from juries “denies the validity of
jurors’ rational disagreement with their fellow citizens who are also judges,” it
infringes on the ideal of self-government. 250
Just this past term, in United States v. Haymond, 251 the Court stressed the
political role that juries play in enabling the people to maintain influence on the
judicial function. Citing to the eighteenth-century diaries of John Adams and
the nineteenth-century commentaries of Justice Story, the Court explained,
“[j]ust as the right to vote sought to preserve the people’s authority over their
government’s executive and legislative functions, the right to a jury trial sought
to preserve the people’s authority over its judicial functions.” 252
Importantly, the Court stressed that a violation of the right to a jury trial
did not only offend “the rights of the accused.”253 It also “divest[s] the ‘people
at large’—the men and women who make up a jury of a defendant’s peers—of
their constitutional authority to set the metes and bounds of judicially
administered criminal punishments.” 254 While that case involved criminal
punishment, the broader principle that the tradition of juries protects not only
accused defendants but also political power for “the people at large” has deep
roots. 255
Judicial centralization sends a message that contrasts sharply to any such
ideal self-government. It telegraphs that the people are not to be trusted to
assess the behavior of the corporate forces that shape their lives. When judicial
centralization takes the form of the Court substituting its view of defendant’s
behavior for the jury’s, it sends another message, too: while the jury may have
thought that the defendant’s behavior was egregious, the folks in Washington
who understand how the world really works don’t agree. What is the lesson we
expect those citizens to take about how “business is done” if they rise through
249. For a compelling discussion of how the diminished public perception and role for juries relates
to the expansion of the populations who are permitted to participate in them, see Laura Gaston Dooley,
Essay, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
325, 335–41 (1995) (describing the “feminization” of the jury in public imagination, and noting, for
instance, that the public perception of the jury as “irrational” and overly emotional tracks the history
of women’s increased participation in juries).
250. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Jury and Participatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029,
1035–41 (2014) [hereinafter Lahav, The Jury].
251. No. 17-1672, slip op. at 3 (U.S. 2019).
252. Haymond, No. 17-1672, slip op. at 3 (first citing John Adams, Diary Entry (Feb. 12, 1771), in
2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 3 (L. Butterfield ed., 1961); and then citing 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1779, at 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)).
253. Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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the ranks? Neither of these are messages that seem likely to spark a sense of
engagement or social responsibility. In some ways, the messaging effect of
judicial decentralization is only compounded by the fact that the Court often
purports to be willing to defer to other actors, even while substituting its own
judgment. The Court can never say that the jury award was “slightly askew,” or
“suboptimal.” When its impression is that the verdict is wrong, to set the award
aside, the Court must declare that it was “irrational and arbitrary,” 256 regardless
of how many members of the public and/or state judges decided the award was
correct.
✦

✦

✦

To be clear, to say that judicial centralization is cause for concern is not to
say that there is no room for judicial review or for limitations on juries and
states in the punitive damages realm. In some circumstances, requiring more
detailed jury instructions regarding which factors may appropriately be
considered, for instance, and interventions intended to reduce the arbitrary
effect of psychological phenomena like “anchoring effects” that may
subconsciously affect any decisionmaker may well be sound policy. 257 And the
increasingly national or even international nature of powerful actors, coupled
with concerns about the extraterritorial effect of punitive damages, may be
reasonable grounds for legislative responses, subject to ordinary democratic
processes. 258 But the attitude towards such interventions matters. If the
animating principle is that citizens and lower-level decisionmakers are irrational
or lack the perspective to decide just how bad corporate policies are, then efforts
to constrain punitive damages will inevitably have the effect of compounding
the alienation and powerlessness that seem so ever-prevalent. On the other
hand, interventions that are directed towards properly instructing juries about
the relevant considerations and protecting against undue extraterritorial effects
seem entirely consistent with participatory norms. 259 Ultimately, the point is

256. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
257. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2003) (reviewing
THOMAS GILOVICH, DALE W. GRIFFIN & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGEMENT (2002)) (discussing implications of recent work on the role
of heuristics and biases in human decision making on a wide array of legal issues, including jury
decisions on punitive damages).
258. As a number of dissenting justices have pointed out, a defining feature of the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area is that it is strikingly legislative in style. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 431
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 516 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See generally Rachlinski, supra note 188, at 944–48 (describing legislative approaches, as
opposed to adjudicatory approaches, as focused on making prospective, categorical rules, and detailing
problems that can arise by focusing on particular cases in making such rules).
259. As Professor Lahav has persuasively argued, even if there are problems with jury awards in
practice, that does not mean that the appropriate solution is to limit jury power:
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simply that there is a real cost—albeit a diffuse and difficult one to measure—
to our polity each time the ratchet is cranked, shifting this form of power over
the powerful entities that affect modern life farther and farther from the people.
CONCLUSION
Judicial centralization—the defining through-line of modern punitive
damages jurisprudence—has benefits and costs. The questions it implicates are
fundamental, going to the heart of the relationship between democratic
participation and the rule of law. Furthermore, the values on both sides of the
ledger are real, and to some extent incommensurable. 260 But the shift toward
judicial centralization in the punitive damages realm does not exist in a vacuum:
it is part and parcel of a broader trend towards the consolidation of power in
the hands of an elite few. At bottom, the centralization of control over punitive
damages represents an erosion of traditional checks on power, effected by the
powerful themselves, and it diminishes the already-limited power of the little
guy to participate in the creation and enforcement of public norms. Given the
reduction of citizen voice across so many dimensions, that is a step in exactly
the wrong direction.

If society wants to reaffirm its faith in the rationality and intelligence of its fellow citizens as
individuals worthy of equal respect, the correct response to concerns of ignorance, confusion,
inconsistency, and bias would be to determine which aspects of our practices within the courts
ought to be changed to improve the jury’s ability to do its job.
Lahav, The Jury, supra note 250, at 1051–53. For instance, we could allow juries to receive information
about awards issued in other cases and provide them with more, rather than less, information about the
circumstances in which appellate courts would be likely to overturn or reduce awards. See id. (listing
ways that juries are disempowered and kept from learning relevant information).
260. See generally LEVY, supra note 218, at 25–41, 283–95 (discussing irreconcilability of pluralism
and rationalism and arguing that freedom requires maintaining some amount of conceptual disharmony
because both are important).

